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NATURE A.."'in PURPOSE Of THE STUDY 
Introducticm and Oriain 
Throughout most of Robert �ennedy'a car••T, Americana had little 
diff1.culty pl4c1ng him in their political scheme of things . To his 
ardont eupporte1'1!1 he was t.he "heir apparent". the young hero, slight­
ly stooped by the tragic burden of his family's misfortunes, t() r.i'hom 
the fallen President had passed the torch. Combining the toughmtnded­
ness and embarrassed compassion of Bogart with the irreverence and 
Atudied eba11in••• of the Beatlea. be ignited the imagination of a 
generation a�oving bored with the aocial-work mentality and plodding 
connnitment of aging New Dealera.l 
In early 1966, the e110tion-1Aden earicaturea of Robert Kennedy as 
hero 11nd villain begim to crumble • • • at leaat around th• edges. Douglas 
Ross reports: 
On February 19, Kennedy broke unmistakably with the Johnson .t.dmin­
istration of Vietnam, calling publicly for a negotiated peac� baaed 
i1pon grntiq the Viet Ceq a voice ill the aoverameot of South Vietnam. 
For liberals who had long derided Bobby as the "Irish Roy Cohnu this 
Wt!\R a traneparent act of oppol'tuniaa ai-..d at outflanking Lyndon 
Johnfton for control of the left wing of the Democratic Party. Even 
lU.llY Kennedy aupportere aaw the breach with LBJ in tho•• term..q. Yet 
Robby Kennedy eeemed determined to becoae the accepted spoke8l1lan for 
the growing discontent in America.2 
In 1967, Kennedy rtUM1Ved hia call for the c .. aatiou of bombing over 
North Vietnam. His office deluged the Senate and the mass me�ia with 
speeches and statements on our China policy, rebuilding the cities, the 
lDouglas Roaa, ed., 
York: Pocket Books, 1968), 
2tb1d., p. xiv. 




foreign Aid, j11"911tl• ••linqueaoy, &tad even the ••11• of .-okin1. But 
Kennedy waa 110et concerned abevt the United Stat•• policy in the Vietna• 
War nd finally called fer the uneoadttioaal caaeatton of boatbing tn 
No'tth Vietnaa.3 
Kennedy'• •peakin1 on the ieaue •f ,eace in Vtetn• gained public 
Attatimi. Although the Senator from Maeeachu•ett8 bed ••pouead tdny cau•• 
during hie political career, hi• rhetortet Oft the Vietnam ta•ue ••eaed ... t 
outet41ld1na to hS.. •u�1>0rtare.4 
On March 20. 1968, ttobert r. ttemae�y announced that he would •••It. 
the 1968 Dewiocratte PT••idential Caadtdaey. There eeeaafl to be a direct 
relation•hip betveeta that 190litical 4-ct•iee a'ftd hi• epeeebe• dealing with 
pe�c0 in Vietnam.5 1.'be writer'• interest ia lennedy'• epeaktng about 
Vietmam va• eha-rpenM, therefore, by public r .. ponee and by Kennedy'• 
l>Olitical decieion. 
S�at ... nt of Purpo•e •1:Mf Si'Th!fi�anc• of th! Studz 
It we• th• hypoth•sia of thi• etwdy that Rob•rt Kennedy's •p•aking 
on tb� i•sue of peace in Vi•tnea va• 1ntelliaent and reaponaible. The 
J>Ut"?OS• of the at�y v .. to C.•t thi• hypotheai• by analyaiua and evaluating 
"Conflict in Vietnam , " a speech delivered by Keimedy in �nhattan, Kau.eae 
on Y.arch 18, 1968. 
---------------------------------, · --·- · · 
lspeecb, u. S. Seute , Marc.h 2, 1967. "The lobby lenuedy RecoTd,." 
!J..!.-� New• ,!!t_d_�OTld aepol't:_, May 6, 1968, 'P• 53. 
4 ''Th• lobby �enned1 Record, 0 p. '" • 
3. 
Iu order to establiah the oriaiulity of the etudy, the index•• of 
research in the field of •peech, and the general index to yis!_�tio_� 
!b_str.!!.�! (1961-1968) wen eheelted. 6 Tb• renew n•ealed tbat no criti cal 
atudy of Robert Cena.edy'• apeakiq ou th• iaaue of peace in VietnAm ha• 
been made. 
The ••lua• of thia atiady ar• of hi•torical, rhetorical, and 
individual eiantficaoee. The late Dallu Dickey, an authority in Aael!'ican 
Public Addreaa. outlined the ba•ic need for future re.search in A!Mtrican 
Public Address in this manner: 
l'irat. ve aaed to cootiaue reaeanh on the obviouly recognized 
•P••'k•t• about whom ve atil l know too little • • •  Second, we aeed 
to gift attaotioa to recoptaed epeakera vbo � been neglected • 
• • Third� ve aeecl to take up the study of speaker• who are either 
coapletely unknown to many of ua or unuaociated with ef fectivenesa 
in �ublic addreae.7 
Robert Kenned y belonged in th• firet two categories listed by 
Dic�ey, therefo re, hie ep•aking •hould be studied. 
11'\e rhetorical and historical value of such a study, would be its 
addition to the exiatiag critict.a of American orators. The values of 
etudyinR Amertc&A apeaker• have beea outlined by .. ay eain•nt rhetorical 
critics. Marie Hochmuth (Nicbola) bu autad u her ailll, "To continue 
- --·-----·------- --·--·- -
6J. Jeffery Auer, "Doctoral Di•Hrtation• ia Speech: Work in 
Progre••." Speech �Oll'&lh•, Vols. XXI!-llUV (1962-1967) � 
Pranklin Knower. "Index of Onduate Study in the Field of Speech: 1962-
1967, '' Speech Hono1rapha • Vole. XXIX-XXXIV (1962-1967); Clyde Dow, 
''Abstraeta of Th .... ta the Piel• of Speech a1'd Draai 1962-1967 • 
'' Speech 
Mono&r,.!!_h9, Vola. XXIX-%XXIV (1962-1967); and Diaaertatio� Abetracts 
(Michiaan � University Microfil . . Inc.), Vole. XXII-XXIX (1961-1968). 
7 Dallu C. 1>1euy, "What Di?'ectioa Sboul• htvre Reaearch in 
American Public Addru• Take?" QuarterlI. Journal of Speech, Vol. XXIX 
(October, 1943), p. 301. 
4. 
th• exaainattOD of - and women who, by oral diacoune. have helped shape 
American ideal• and ,,olicy. ''8 
,A.aide fTOB the ..iuea of thi• study to hiatorical and Thetorical 
critieilllft, such an effort oan beuaftt the writer ae an individual. Ho .. r 
Roct.ett a,>T .. M• this idea: 
was� 
. .. .  a aaater'• ••NY tD&Y aate a real, •Yen if & minor contri­
bution, to historical kncvleda• and tbue become a source of justifiable 
pride on the put of the ntbor. Mon blporcant • • • 1� th• diacipline 
vbich ahould reault fro• the uae of the c�itical method. 
�ayna !I. � •__.rtsed the ..iue te the writer in this 11&aner: 
The pre-p&raU.oa of th• Cbe•i• can be a rich educational experience. 
which (1) Jn>•id•• trahia& in research .. thoda; (2) requires the 
integratioa of the keovlecla• aDfl che aklll of •av•ral fielde • • • •  ; (3) 
makes the atudent an 'espel't' vi�hin a ct.flaed Are&# and (4) lead• to 
conclusioaa re1ardittg the theory and practice of rhetoric in our ovn 
tirae.10 
Th• •peecb which wae anAlyud and evaluated ii\ this •tudy 
"Conflict in Vietnam." O.livered in Manhattan, l.aaaas. on 
Ma-reh 11. 1968. 
i:Aneaa. to u audinc• of a�proxtaately foUTt•n tbcMaaau .  in tu 
8ltari• ltocbutb, ed., !L-to!.I a�0Criticie�..L�FiS.!!!..!.�£}..!�, 
!-_!!He....!! (Nev York: l..o1ll•A'• Gi-eu and Co •• 1955), \>reface. 
9H ... r Heebtt, !h• critteal !!!t1*1 la Rl•tori�l. �H•rcl!..!8'1 
ru.t�.Y. (New York: The Mac:Millian Co •• 19SS). p. 12. 
10wayne N. Tbomp•oo. "Contemporal"y Public Mdr•••." �.!.�_ill 
:!.O.,!!tt....!J..of IJ!��· Vol. XXltl (Oetober, 1947) • p. 277. 
5. 
Nicholaa Gymnuiw::: at 2:00 in the afternoon. Among tho•• attending were 
Governor and Mre. Landon, Governor and Mre. Docking, and Seuator and Mra. 
Pearson. However, &�proximately 10,000 of the attendance were K.S.U. 
atudenta, auother 1,000 were faculty aud ataff, and the re .. ining 3,00<> were 
citi••ns froa Manhattan aad tbreughout the atate.11 That waa Xennedy ' • 
apeeifie audience. The aeneral audience was the nation.12 
Thie particular •P••�b was choeen for the following reasons: 
(1) The apeecb atated a clear poaitioa on l.auned7'• ataad in Vietnam. 
The thane of peace in Vietnam wu preeent iu all of Robert 
l.ennecly'• cuspatp a,eech•• • but the �ans•• apeech dealt apeci!i­
cally with Vietnam. 
(2) Textual authenticity vae .. tabliebed by a tape recording. 
(3) The audience could be identified. 
(4) T1te •P•ech ... credited with launching Cannedy'• presidential 
caapaian. 
The primary source• uaed to gain information about Kennedy, the ie-
sues with vhich be dealt, and the society to which he spoke , were: Robert 
��ennedy :_!P.o•tle of Cha� (New York: Pocket: Books, 1968) ; R. F. K.: ----
Bie Life anct�a�h (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1968); lt.ahin and 
LewiB'. -pie U. S. In Vietnll!!. (Nev Tork: Dial Press, 1967); Joseph 
Buttinger's, Th• Smaller Dra19n ('Nev York� Frederick A.. Praeger� 1956); 
and Nguyen Van-Tahi and Nguyan Van-Mung ' s, !_Short BistoIT of Vietnam 
(Vi�t!UlWl : Tiatt• Publi•hing Co., 1958). 
Criteria and ProceduTe. A. Craig Baird tells us that our resporudbility 
as 4uditore an4 .tMNr• i• not to aceept or reject ideas and propaganda un-
critically. One reaaon ve atudy Jonathan Edwards, Henry Clay, Abraham 
llt.etter from Willi- w. Boyer, Coordinator of Landon Lecture•� 
J:anaas Sta�• Unive!'aity, Manhattan, buu, April 24, 1969. 
12see chapter II for further audience analysie. 
6. 
Lincoln. Pranl-.l.in D. Roo•evelt and others. ia to fraae criteria of effeceive 
speaking aQ<\ •J'ply auch teat• to present and future platform speakera.13 
n1e particular criteria u••d in tbia •tudy were derived fn>m tbc)•e 
uasd by Tau JU\'PP• Al�ha in selecttag their Teeipient for Speaker-of ·-the-year 
«W4Td.14 Also as•i1tin1 the writer in forming criteria were Albert Croft'• 
"n1e Function of �betorical Crlticiell. 0 and ThOt'IA• R. Nilsen's "!ntef'l)re­
t4tive Punctiona ot the Cntie.016 
The TL\ •�ggeated tht'ee criteria! 1Dte11iaence, eff�ctivenes• and 
re•ponaibility. Two, intellisence and Ta91»0naibilicy, were aelected for 
uee in thia atudy. 'Due to the coftteraporary natuTe of the apeoch) the 
necessary btatortcal per•pectiw of the epeecb vaa lacking so af fectivene•• 
va• not u•ed. 
Tt\e firat queetion r&iaed for .valuation of Mr. t<ennedy'e 
Vietoa� peace addre•a vae: Was ltobert teanedy'• speaking intelligent? From 
the TKA criteria and Albert Croft'• 11-nte Fwction of R.betorical Critic tam.'' 
the vrit6r c:iouatructed a number of quution• vhich would aid in aeausing 
---------------- ---------· .. -------
13,t.. Craig laird. ''Tb• Study of Speeehea, tr SJ?•!!ILS:r,..t�illl!: 
�et hod!.__ and Hatetl!!!_. ed .  Will in A. t.iualey (Dubuque. Iowa. Wtft. C. 
'Brown Company P\tbliel..-C's, 1968), lt• 42. 
14•1Tau Kappa Alpha Speaker of the Tear Criteria.,•• ThLl.£!.•ker. 
(Crawfordarllle, Itldiana, 1955). 
15.Ubert J. Croft, "Th• ?unction• of lhetorical Ct1t1ci8'ftl.11 
�arterlx Journal of Speec�, XXXII (Spring, 1956), p. 39. 
16Tbomu R. MilHn. '�ntel"pretattve !'unction• of the Critic,'' 
��-stern �. XXI (Sprin1, 1951). p. 70. 
7. 
A. Wbat we�e the a1suaptioa.a upoa vhich tb4a •P••eh was based? 
». tnle.t were th• u1n ide.u ••t fol'th in tM\ apeect'l1 
1. What Wlle the l&TS-T illpltcative t14ani•a of the speech? 
c. Were the tcteu van:aoted by the •vide.nce uaed in the apeecbT 
1. What val'e the uniqua and rel&�ivelJ artiettc w.ye in which the 
•P••ker ueed .videGce in order to imply ..-ntngef 
2 .  !>id th• •i-eaut' thoughtfully 1ntarpret the evidence? 
3. Wu tb.e apeakei- coa.cioua of the 11truth11 ae it ap�eat'�d at i 
give tt.e tn hietoryT 
.& • Waa it ob\tS.0"5 that the ape4ker wa• awat'e of the neca•u1ary 
relatioubtp betweeu ld .. a ud evidence? 
•· Ven the iutaacea fl'oa whicb tbe infennc• wae dcv&lo1)ed 
auf ftetently nu11aroue to be •ianificao�T 
b. Were th• inat.ueu of •ucb a character as to provi.dQ a 
•'9tem&tical1y typical ...,1. of the field as a whole? 
n. Were the ideu vell 64apted to the audience! 
1. How did th• apuk.H adapt hlael f to th• audience? 
e. Did he have a gool l"efutar1au that pl'eeeded him tQ the place 
of apeald.n&T 
'-· Yould tlt.e audtenee Yiw hill u tnwtwort'hy? 
<: .. Wu tM •peaker pereonally dynat1ic? 
d. J>1d the 81>9•k• wa• obvioue elCpl'u•ioM of good 1111? 
2. How did the speaker adapt b�e idea• to the audience? 
a. Did he a tee.pt to connect tdeae vi th valau held by tb• 
audienc:ef 
(•) Did be r.vttalis• old beliefat 
(),) Did ha rel.at• old b&l.iefa to ''aw' idue 01' pt'opo•als! 
b. Md audfeftC• nactlon S.tM!iaate the tdeu wet'e well adapted? 
ln ord•l' to check. UDderatand aad naluate the bu1c a•auasptiou. end 
t.o e.ruilyse the oain 1d4Mls of th• epeech. t!l• writer proceeded in the !oll.ot.'1.ug 
listened to ••veral t1111ee. SeeoD4ly. the speech va• compar.ed �1th the "Oanu-
acript and thirdly. a detailed oatliD• waa pre,.nd to aid the nalu�tioo of 
the study. A atatlar procedu.re vae follow.d while atudyin& the relation-
shtp of evidence to conelue1ou. 
To a4equata1y ...,.luate the 4u .. t.ion: \Jere the idaaa well adapted to 
th• cu�i4'ncet, the vrit•r analysed the apeaur aud ht• idaaa . Thcn.snn and 
Baird announcet 
'For & •�k•r. the audi�uc• is the most iaq>ortaut ele..�Dt in the 
oitUfttion and if he 1• to be atfective. the ., .. ker nsus� adjuat both 
• . ..,�,-.,,_ _ _ _ _ , ...... .. _.,_..-;.,..o_ .. .....,... __ o_• ________  IW\ ___ .......  ., �� - --.. - -- -.. --.. - .i,,.;.. -,,.- -..,.. ........ � - · 
8. 
himself and his ideas te it. The basic conaideration, then, is 
adaptation , or adjustment to the variables of huaan behavior as 
found in a specific aroup of hearers. The general objective of 
the speech eritic ie to find out how coapletely the spee.ker adapt• 
h:1.a rtmarks within the limttatiowt impoeed by the particular audience 
8ituotion.17 
W1.th these observ.tiona in mind. the secoad major question was 
det���!ned; Wal!I Mr. ltennedy'e speaking reaponaible? Concerning this 
t'unct:!on of the rhetorical critici, Thomas R. Nilsen declared: 
• • • that a vital function of •Pfft?h crlticin should be to inter­
pret the tnaaning of spee�hee., not in tha senae of clarifying what t'he 
spesker dir&etly intend• but i n  the aanae of what �I apeeeb indirectly 
implies, for man and the society in which be lives. 
The following queetiona were abatracted from TKA and 
Ni.Ir.en's 11InteT"pretative Function of the Critic , u tn order to aid the clear 
focus qf the laet Jaajor question: Was Mr. Kennedy's sp6aking responsible? 
A. Did the speaker reveal an awareness "f the social con&�Mtttences of 
hie speech? 
1. Did th• coneapte deal honestly with \Jl&J:l realiatic.ally relating 
him to the probl... be f,a� t 
B. Was the speech free from dema101uery and charlatanism as shown 
by cont&l\t, laaauaga and delivery! 
The rhetorical biography, .Americ•n public opinion about the war in 
Vi�tnam0 and the brief ht.atory of the Vietn-. con flict. all aet forth in 
ch.apter Il, provided some of the Mee•aary bacqround for &ll9Vering tbe 
question of respoaaibility. 
______ ____ , __ .. ___ _.... __ �--� ------- -�--...... ____ " _______ _ 
17Lester Then•••n and A. Craig Baird, �p_eech, �.!..!ti�iam (New York: 
Ronald Preas COM'pany, 1948), p. 360. 
9. 
Tb� l>t"it.et' alao noted hew realt.tically k•zma.dy related to the problems he 
facedf �nd this wu dou by J.ooU.aa •t the actual ait.wation tn Vietn«a as 
revealed in chapt•l' II .. ao.d compul11a it with his actual apoec:h content� 
tn decermintna reapouibUit7 , the vrit•r altt0 D'1ted vbetht"f tbe 
language and deli'Mry. Ad� vaa define.cl u 1•a person who •Mk.8 to 
aain pe-rsonal. advaataa• by apeeioua er utravapnt cl.at., p�oadsH or 
ch�:ri .. •. •119 A eharlatao i• "oaa who aa.ke• showy or noiay pretopes to know-
Thus, the following ll'UalD&Ty ie an outline of the criteria !o� onlay8iG 
and evaluation vbich �· bea ab•t�actect f�oa th• 'tU erlteri& and aeaisted 
�Y Croft'• "The Juactioo of Rhetorical Critictisa, 11 Niaen '• "Interpretath'e 
Punetion• of th• Critic , u aod 'tbou9ell aJMI ltaird '• .. SpMCh Crlc1.c1Jlo•1: 
l. �IJ Robert K41D!\!d!'• SJ?!&ki!!J, i�l!JlJ.J!!!.1 
A. \."hat ftre tho as.-.ptiooe upon vhf.ch tbe apeech was ba•ed? 
'B. libat wa• tbtt .,eaul''• 1>US't>O•• and what wel:'e th• mA1n ideas 
••t forth in tho •IMHlchf 
1. Yb.et vere �be val'io'5• levea of aeautni baplied by the 
idea con�t unite in tM spMdl • • • thst 1•. �t vaa 
the larger implicative mun.iq of che. speech'? 
c. W•re tti. ideaa val"rantad by t� eV1deace WM4 iu the. tSPil.Cb? 
1. What were th• unique and nlatively ar:tistic w.nyG !.n which 
the •�et uaed rhetorical ideas in or-dei- to i�ly 
•eanins• from evidence! 
........ ... -�_.� ... --... --... --.  �· ----· ___ _,_._.,_. ........ _.......,_..,., _.._ _ _ _ , _ ._ ......... --·�----.. - .... -- ......... ... ··--
19woah Ve\tater, ���-�·.!:� • �!'.� � !.a!.•.!!l'!S.!.�.!J>.!..c.S..1:�.D­
Vol. l (Chicago: ltftcyelopedi• lrltanalca. Inc., 1966), p. 1002. 
20 
f}��d., l>· 973. 
10� 
2. Did thei epeabr thoughtfully int•rpi-et tba evidence? 
3. Yu it obvious that the apubr va. conscious of the it truth>' 
u it appeared at a i;iTen tilM 1n hu�ory? 
4.. Wu it obvt� that the ·�a�ar vat1 awl"ICt of th1f Q!.\Ctssary 
nlat!ouhip betwen ideu and evidac•t 
a. \?ere tbe il18tancee f� vhf.ch the infcr•nca !Mae; 
developed euf fiete�tly maae�oua to b• •isnificant? 
b. Yen the irult.GCea of auch a charncter 11a to provide 
• ayatematie.al.ly typieal •8111>1• of th• f teld &B a 
wf\ol•T 
c. �•l'e th• face. reported and cl ... lfied accurgt�ly? 
t>. Wen the lc!ue we11 o4apted to the aud181\ce'? 
1. Bw did the spukor adapt bhutel.f to the audieuQef 
a. Did be have 4 good roputation that prec•ded him to the 
place of •peaking' 
b. t.tou.ld the audie�e view him aa 1:ru•tvortby? 
c. Woe the a�eake� peraonally dynasnlcf 
d. nid the apeak&r use obvioue �xpre•aiona of good-w1111 
2. How did th• apeAker adapt bta id•aa to the &udieo(U)1 
a. Did h., at�t to connect tdeas with value• held by the 
audience? 
(a) l>td he T••italis• old beliofat 
{b) Did he �•l&te old btslief• to �'wav� ideas ar pro)M)at>ls? 
b� Dtd audiuce reactio11 indi<Utt• that ideas wer� wall a­
dapted? 
II. Wu Jtobert t:e�4I.'• •P!!;lr:lg t'ef1'«'8.!.�J.!.t 
A. Did tho ape&ker ravo&l u aver.au• of tho aocial e<>naequanct?• 
of hi• ep«ach'l 
l. Did tha concal't• deal holl4atly v1th w.c re.alietic:.ally r�­
lating ht� to th• p1"0blet111 be f�c-.17 
JS. Wu the speech ftte ft:oa d-.aoguery and charlatanism as &ho-..m 
by content. J..anguaae, a.ud. delt•ery? 
function: (1) �atur• and purpoe• of the study; (2) The l'heto�icel �iosr�phy 
of �obert lteonedy, and a brief h1•tory of Viet�� (3) Analyaia of the Ma�ch 
18, 1968 speech "Cc>nfliot in Vi•trw:att; aod {4) 'Mlo conclusion (eonta:bainit 
the �•ulte of tl\41 aC\1dy). 
Chal)te't t t'!'a&ted the origin of the study, purpoa'> and sianlficumae 
., ,. _ ___ ........ ___ . _______ __ _ _ 
11. 
of the stutly� workins hypothoaia, oraanisation of th• atudy9 and criteri a 
�o be ueed in the rhetorical aualya1a. Included ia chapter I was an iu­
Yeltigctiou of ttateriQla that wer• WMd which aided the �riter in 
ort�n!sstion of th1• paper. 
Chapto.t' II was conc•rned with a bioaraphical atudy of Robert Kennedy 
with an •m�hasie on h1• -4ucation and background havina rhetorical a1an1-
f 1@�oee. Since bi• youth and p.eraon&l lif• were important to h18 later 
e�eaking. these .atters were iocluded with tbe atudy of hie philosophy aod 
id•al1. 'gecau•• ni• int•r••t• were in aaay fi•lde ·of refoni, tluJ writer 
•elected those aoet outatandina. vith special eaphuia iiven to his part in 
the Vietnu peace !M;>'Vement. Also. cb&ptor II Jaacrib.wl the rhetorical 
atrx>spbero during which the aelected speech wu ptr«uHauted and tarpha.ataed th• 
attitude& toward peace in Vietnaa. particularly thoae �lcl by Am�ricAne. 
Chapter III undertook the rhetorical analyaia of the chosen speech 
in order to �rify or de·l\y the bypothaeia that Robert Kennedy ' • •J•eakins 
on the ia•u• of peace in Vietnaa wa. int•lligent and respon.aible, 
Chapter IV attempted to draw th• aeneral cooclwatona r.eultiag fram 
tbe r�torical •nalyai• �t the apeech. 
Tvo appendicae and a biblioaraphy followed chapter IV. Appendix 
A pr•s•nted lett•r• of c:oneapot\dnc:e. Appendix B co1atained • copy of the 
a<ldr••• written and delivered by MT. XemwMly and •tudied in this pa.per. 
'"'• bibliography pn>vided a lietia& of ilaportant baok1round � 
it0urce msteri•l• foT thi• •tudy. 
- -------- ----------------- ------------ __ ... ____  
12. 
Cons_!.�j__� 
In QrdeT t.hat the �ead¢r lllight h&v• clea�er per8�etiv• of thi$ f l'l'llC 
chapter •• be eoatroatad cha re.aitd.'flS ebapt•r• of thia et.udy � it vu the 
purpo8:e thtiatl l•r. to t�e9t tha followiftg: 
(1) lnttocluct1on eftd OTlata of the St'Udy 
(2) Statil'llent of P\arpoaa atMl Slgn1J1canc• of �be Study 
(3) Mate�tal• aad Crit•rf.a of the Study 
(4) Ot'gaaisatioa of the Stlady 
(5) Cr>ac.lu.t<>D 
ou.mm 11 
The pur,oae of th'- chapter ia to p� the reader with • bio1raphy 
of the apeaker. l.obert tr. �,. with particvlal' attention co his eel-
Alao, the chapter vaa vrittec t• provide a brief hiatorical back-
gtound of the var in Vietn• an4 reaettiona 1n the Uni� Stat .. to thllt 
war. 
� Rh•torlcal_B�r•!h.Y. 
lOBIRT PRA!fCll 'llNNBDY. third llOB of JOHPb 'P. lfmnedy and Roae 
wa• 1 M .. aachuaett• beaker but had recsetv.d hi.a coll•aa education at 
Harvard etid aiade ttCMMthtn1 of a ..- tor hl .. •lf •• a local 1ut1tut1oa.l 
Wh•u Robert vu fourtMD . che ftrat l.etmady of ht• geaentioa, old-· 
ut brothel' Joe Juuio1', bad wade hie •ntry loto politic• u a delezate to 
the DenK)Cratic Natiotaal Convention of 1940. 
After briefly attead1aa • C•tholle acbool in Jtbod• Island. Robert 
va• erolled ta a poeh -pr., e4bool. Milton •cadeay, outatde lo•toa . 'l1le 
erpet"ieoc•� like fl09t •f hta eehool experience•. wa8 not particularly happy. 
lEditor• of .V..rtcan Bel'ita�e, !!' 1. l.!...t-1!.� Life _and £?!.•tJ! (New 
York: Dell Puhliahing Co., Inc • •  1968), p. 18. 
14. 
Intensely introverted in his late teeua, be was. according to a claaS111Ate, 
''nc good at small talk • • •  no good at aocial a..eniti••, and no sreat 
.., lover. '1' 
Although K.emledy etteuded Milton Academy, Henard University and 
the University of Virginia lav •4hool, he va• net note4 .. a acholar. He 
received a I. A. degree at Harvard in 1948, where hi• chief acC01tPliebae1lt 
eeeaed to be football. Re wae enrolled in only one speech class. The name 
of the course waa FundUMantal• of Speech, caught by Profuaor FedeTiek C. 
Packard.3 Again, according to one of bi• cl .. natu, Kennedy displayed 
shy charaeteriatica vhicb 1184• it difficult for hill to eJlpreae himself 
eosily. 4 
After araduatioa, in 1948, Kenuedy apent the aum11er covering th• 
Arab-Jewiah hoatiliciee aa a •ar correapondent for the Boaton Po•t.5 
._.._.......___.___._ 
In 1948, Robert r • .Kennedy vaa adaitted ta the Univeraity of Virginia 
law Rchool. At Vtrainia. he plodded avay at hi• atudi•• in lackluster faahion. 
According to hi.a pTOf•••or of labor law: 
• • • be had lot• en the ball, but be would never ••t the Thames on 
f irc scholafttically • • • lie had an underatanding of labor relations 
a:ll right. How auch he underatood of the finer po1nta of lav is 
debateble. 6 
. -··--·--- ----
3'�etter froll'l �imball C. Elk.in• , Senior Assiatant in the llarvard 
University Archives, c .. bridge. Mas•achueette, April . 1969. 
5•:The !oh by lCennedy bcord , 11 U. S. Nevs and Worl�. Repor.t (May 6, 
1968). "P· so 
15. 
While et the v'uiversity, &enne4y say not have acquired an inthlllte knew-
l.ed'le of law but he �td a¢qo1re a l'epu.tatim:a u an enalyat of world affairs. 
Cham.. to ac o.ac�nly aood paper on tJMt talta Mtti....ut aad a reputation 
.. li. fighter for hi• pr1Dc1plu. Kezme4y'• •iani.ficant arowth ic self-
eJqlresa1on and in¥Ol,,...ot vith world affair• perhape (1llMl chiefly becau•e 
school. 
'nl• uat nwaliq ., and by far tbe ••t prataeworthy. of Bob 
�aunedy•a &CGQ9Pl1•htft41nta durf.Aa hla t*DUre •• Pree1deut of the inruJD 
1Avolve4 a bitter flaht over • acbelduled appe&r&Gca bJ DY. Ralph Bcuwhe, 
vho ba.d aecel)ted au 1nvit4Cion to speak to the atudents with th• proviso 
that the Virginie aucltnce be 1ntqrated. Bolt\>y� accerdisaa to a f'onm 
c�itt•e u.•ber, "blew bl• stack" at the Southern stud.ate who Ta­
belled agaln1t •1an1n1 a re•olutiou favorina the intearation they •pprov­
ft"f Qf tn priuc1p1e.. lle wu t10 Md he could h.swdly talk. a. had a lack 
of t.1Dderatendint of the pl'Obleiaa th.ffe peo-pJ.. faud; to bia it •.-00 
illogical to aupport tto•thing but be uuwillin11 to •iRn for it. Bobby 
can-ied bi• fiaht to the Prea1dant of the U'A1venity after rejecti.q a 
eonq:>rotd1e eolution. and Runche spoke to ao integrated audienee. It had 
b•en Boeby�• ft.rat big fiabt ou a uttttr of priac:lpa cand he bad won.7 
Dur� hi• ,...ra in law achool B.obert �1 met aa.d unled &tbel 
Skekel. who bad be.ea a rooamate of Jeao K4auiiedy'a •t M&uhattanville C�llege 
of the Sacttd U.art in New Yo1tk'• " .. tdleat•T CountJ. Mi.a• Skakel met 
Robtrt during a all vaaation at Mouut Tremblut 1A 1944. In June, 1950, 
th.y we1'e aaniec1 111 St. Mary'• Clwl'Gh ta Creaavich. Cono.8 




Sun. Rob1'y t.eanedy J.ecord, ., 'P• 50. 
16. 
Senn ta. 
Rftturoing to �aehington in 1953. after the successful oanrpaign of 
his brotber, Robert Kennedy joined the staff of the Senate Peras.nent Sub-
co�ittee an lnveeti1atiens. headed by Senator Joaeph R. McCarthy� of 
Wisconsi.n, as one of fifteeu usiatant GC>\m8fala. Only six mo11ths later, 
Rcb@rt Kennedy returned to the Senate Inveetisationt1 Subconrdttee as 
c.ouneel for the n.mocratic. miuority.9 
Wh4Ul De�rats reaatned eontrol of Co1\3res• in the 1954 election. 
the 1.nv1t8tiaatiug grou.p wu reoraan1ze4 under Senator Johll L. McClellan of 
Arkaneaa. Kr. Kennedy becawae chief counael in 1955 at the age of twenty­
nin�.,10 
The Senate Select Comaittee on Im9roper A�tiviti .. in Labor and 
Mana�ement waa for11111d in 1957. Robert Kennedy bee ... chief counsel of a 
eixty-five-1'.l4n investigation staff - one of the lartt .. t ever ueembled in 
Con.gr1P.1Ja. The Co11mitt .. conducted inciuiri•• into labor rackeu and crime 
e�icat••· includina a11ege4 abuses in th• Intentational Brotherhood of 
Te�etere.11 In relation to this eo111ittee. u. S. Neve reporta: 
Dave Beck va• depoaed as Preaicient of the Teaaters, aDd sentenced 
to prison for stealing union funde. The Committee accuaed Jamas 
1-Ioffa, who eucce•ded Beck, of nmDiug a "hoodlua 01Rplre,''l and of mia­
uing \D\iOn funda. Mr. Boffa called Bob•Tt Kennedy 0a r11thlesa little 
monater.11 Mr. Hoffa 1•• convicted ou jury-taape1'itll charges in 1964 at Chattanosa� Tenn.l 
--- - _ . _ _ . _ __ ... ____ _ .. - .. - -- --�-- -.. ---- -------� 
91'Tha Bobby Kennedy Reeord," p. 50. 
lltbid. 
17� 
CTf�1.1tion of • national criae comaieaion to ••t"Ve .- a '1central intolU.�e 
�cyri of eria.iaal intonaation for •OM MYeaty federal agancie& and lllOTe 
th•'11 10 ,000 local law-enforc ... nt unite aeroes the nation • .  J .  Edgar llacrnr ,. 
D1T��tor 0f th� 1 .  B. t . ,  O�potl� the idea 0\\ the around that it miaht l•ad 
to cre.eti•�n of a 11uaclonal police force . ·113 
Agata� in 1960., l\llibart Kenuedy left th• Qovernaent to beeoirte the 
utionlll  �lllJl'•l&n 'MtMIU foT Jobn F .  Xe'DDedy . Aftu winnins the election . 
the Pre•idaut-eleet .teetauhd hia thirty-year-old brotb�r R�hert ., to be 
th"' '!'.! , � • .ltto'l'My General . 14 
id•ntif1e� in \1twa articles u the "Aasiacant ?resident, 1' ·�an :t.n 
� 1a·1htniton , '' and "Ora:..sa-Boota Al&baaaaclor to Bftzrywhere .111.S 
When th• Rede •tarted the lerlit\ Wall ia 1961 ., after Preeident 
Kenned y ' •  coufrontation with Soviet Pre1'.liet' i'.hl't&Sh<::bev 1.n Vieun:t , Robtrt 
X,f)rm�.;.iy i• &Aicl to have �at.ed ••'lldin:g U. S .  t\"OOp nt.nfoTeeM!nt• to 
16 :i.Mrrlin throuah i&at Oenaay � to teat lluaeian react�on . il•o� Mr .  
p .  2 .  
13 
!.�· 
, t.! "' :.> "The Conec'i«nee of R. !!' .  'K • . ' 1  Th.!.J�!RJ?!>_l'�t" (Pebt'uary 22 s 1968) • 
18 . 
Kemaady was dos¢ribed aa �'favoriag a firm 11.ne again•t Cc1ml\Uniet ag3ttes­
son in Vi•tJt.aa and Lao• . .. l6 
In 1�64, aft•I' Pneideat John F. Kenn.ty ' •  death. Preeident John9011 
th.at year, Hr • .Johnaon eliaioated Mr .  �ettnedy ,  atul all other Cabinet offf.ceT• 
from coneideration for the 196S Vice-p�es1denti•1 nomination. 
�r. i.'..ennedy ai:moUt\Ced August 25th that he would Tim for the U .  S .  
Sen.ate in Ntiw York State , after l'ee1gnins from the MAeaachwsetts delegation 
to the Detnoct'atic �J ational Convntion in Atlantic City. ile reai&ned from 
his Cabinet 1>0•t on s.;,tetAber 31� 1964 .17 
�rtera cut all picture• of Robe'Z't out of a fib biography of John F. 
Kanuedy that wu to be ahowa at th" l>aocra.tic llattonal Con:"•ntion. "18 
plur�lity ot 719 ,693 vote.a, rwining l , 089,407 voto• be.bind the Jobnaon­
ft�hrey national tieke c . 19 
�ile in the U. s .  Set1&t•, 'Robert �•nnedy had b .  n an outepoken c�it1c 
of the De110cratic Adltiut.•tt'atioe on both do .. etic aad foreip policy. A� 
tba •••• t-ime, hi• votioa r.cord •bowed that Ml' .  K•nnedy auppot'ted tr.oee 
policie• which were a ?a�t of th• "Great Society11 •tMndiq proarauu . 
_, .... ---·--·---.. -...- .. --�---
16!liJ!f ... 
17 � ..!J�.t • . 104. 





The · •wal' cm �rty, ... wed1�n and Medicaid• nnt sow lem�ts ) 
•!!!�n..�trotion c::Lt.i•• ." ,n·hA� relMVal. cO'MID.nity faciliti.6& . public 
wrlw . naU .. oul teach•w• e<tl'P•. fedor:al 61.d for •o.hNla �nd co llqu . 
;:r.:.�r:�ovor dovalO)*Amt .m 'WM:atioul. tra1.oit13� big.her td� u.ege , higher 
��If��� p3-yriaente •�.d 5oc�al �ac�rity beuef1ts , lonie? �n�ley.mcn� in­
ou.-r.t.\tl<.a pcyicMmta . ubae ws.a•-traD&it Mlbaidta. . food-au.ap �roa�•. 
M.�hti\'�y �ieoutificotiotl .. n11oo.U-dvwlopl?.�H�t fur.do for 11de"Presa.ed tlTtUlS' . n 
"rA f•n» �ubaidiaa.20 
With-drawa.l f'l'Cm Vi•tllsa 1• vntbiakahle • � • uot only lt•v.e thr .. 
Mlm1::d,.t.r-4tion.s pl-Gdg.d their. &Ut»J>Ot:t to South Viq.c� . bu' huuciNds 
of t.hooea'1d• of people in South Vietoaa • • • �1ndf"'1 ol th� 'b:t\ltal 
��p�isals th•t fcllv�ed �"\Ch '<lithdrm1•l free Nor�b Viot\� in 
1?54 • • •  hava euk.ed their livu oa our pl'CMliau . 21 
Rf'hort s. M�r•. Whlta UQuae &d.viaor Mca.o�a• SWJ4y ud rovtua .AlA­





Itaediete awtpe.neion of U .  S .  �ombing of COl!l'mUnist North 
V 1e ttlm!l. 
�.t>lldual �1thdrft'fal fram South Vietnam of Amarlcan and North 
Vietnaonesc forces .  to be replaced by an iotct'IU)ti6nal force:. 
A fiaal ,,olitical aettlffflleftt � bae4td on free electionc , in which 
all South Vietuare•e , includin� th• Viet Cong, �rould take par t . 23 
Adminutration� Me told a union con"9ntion in Now York on Ausuet 2 l .  1967 , 
that elections in South Vi•tnaa were a '' fraud . •·24 112 Cbica3o jl l"ebruary 8 ,  
1968 , 1w claimed tha U. S .  could not win the va.r tu Vietnam . 
'l'nrc-ughout th• years between 1965 and 1968. Robert Kannody ' s  speak-
in3 career vas outstandinJ. Re bec81Ml l'C)litically recognised by taking 
He deli•ered speech•• on the ia•uea of poverty, bueineea , social eet:urity. 
med1care, crime and cirll rt1hta during this thr•e year iteriod . But, hi• 
1tron3e•t concern w•• VietNll!t. In the early y•ar of 1968, to the ti1'9e he 
w•s ae•a9oinat6d , it ia oot known the exact nuaber of l)latfom s�eachea he 
• • • he • • gt.._ eaiougb .,._._. on tbi• ie•ue to dedicate one to 
4tvory atat• in the Union. When I flret liat•M<l to hill. I wo"1d aot 
ht\ve voted fer ht. for anythiD1 . Ile vu too cocky , militant, negative . 
end n111·ro�. Tod•J� I ha.,,. ao doubt.a ebout him • • • I would vote for him for anythi11.1. 
P.ohert P .  ltennHy • a  f ir•t aoat 
ag�iN!tt U .  s .  inYC>lvement 1a Vietnma, c..a iD a apaecb deliver..S February 
5 ,  1968, in Chicaic , Illinois. Ou March 1 6 ,  Kennedy told th• CoWPOnwealth 
2 3  
MThe Aaoay of Vietnata . "  �k. (Noftmber 28. 1967) , p .  35 
24Ibicl . 
25"A SanatGr Nned �edy .1t  !!!!!!.'!.� (May 17 . 1968) ., p .  17 . 
21. 
Club in Sa·D franciaco that it had �OS. ''umd.•t:&Ubly clea1l' to t1c\M thee so 
lon� 1u1 tynd\ln D .  Johaaon vaa Pre•iderat, oui: Vi•tn• policy would cooslst 
of �nly mot'e var, more troop• . more kill.ilia , au4 ac>re eenael••• do�t.-�ctiou 
of the eount.ry va were auppotSedly th.er• c.o ••ft . ''26 
for analyst. ta thi• atudy. Much 20 � t.be Senator �ced tba.t M veuld 
run to� th• 1)1taQc�etic l)Oainatieft foy Prfllllident of th• U�ited States . F� 
���....22!."!!!>.!L.'!.!Y&N. Robesr.t. r ... .!9.�..l'-· Tbe general public va� faecin-
•ted � �?tMdy . poeiti•ely &ad M£&t1"1y. 1.,ff,le wen free with their 
opinions about '&ob'by. while bopel•••lJ inadequate 1Q the nalu.at1on• of 
thOl!l t 1• ••id Milton Vlo'P'at . 21 Sa.e of the#• atu.d Ol)iftbma are •t>n••ed 
f� the follovif'I �let 
MAl.Y MCGIORT (¥Titer fo� the l'YeGt.na Stu) : n'!'h•n was ao w...ach 
urgeuc7 aOll atheetlcity in lobhy • a  1 .. 11111• &bo�t Vietua. lie 
eould bav• convinced anyone of h1a •1nc:etity. So � paopa w.re 
c0timtiq on hht • vatting for him • • • • • • • •  028 
MlTOll SAM YORTY t "lobby �,. vi.th th• VMt 90\mt of money to 
b\Jy a�yst• . etrzaniaere and �alt vrlten > was a real thre.t to 
4-.c>ci-acy. &obby Kannedy. v•• the product of the p\lblic-relations 
Ntl .  He ht11d •biltty. "t oourH, bu.t they made bl!!i juet •• tb•7 would 
uke • mn1e •t•r . Ba vas the 1W4olpb Valentine of oiar <lay.1129 
... -----..-.-- -� ... � ...... ... �- -- -----..........-.�-......... -�-----____._...,--�-...----·,_,_� 
26"'11l• Bobby Kennedy a..ce nl ,  11 1> ·  53. 




OORE VIDAL1 11Bobby Eetmady wu a. caomrentionnl politician, cautioned 
to the point. of t1aid1t)' . �t t.be ... tille, be vu ..ottonally cv.a­
tdttad to t.be rl1etorle if Mt the euhatence of rofot'm� �·"30 
DR?:\l' ?BARSON: 111.obert F. J:ennedy vA• a un "1th ft terrific Senate 
nscot'd , • lot of courap - eo..t.._. boNerina on sall - an.d • 
atron1 belief 1.n t.b& d.S.vtoa rtaht of Ken--S.ye . Tbou&b the thirteen 
colon!M 4t..ca!'4ed tba cU.viM riaht of � ooe hundred yeara be­
fore !ob�y '• lrieh anc..atora mia�ated to loston > be at!ll operated 
on the tbeol")' that the aaanet ·r.iau.,,. -1lovl4 inherit the \ftdta 
Mou•• throne. � 31 
VICTOR LA.SKY � ''Thi• py wa• no tdealiet . lie had e traendous e.,ility 
to f .igu*'9 wt what ,,.. bugiq 11bel'a.la iJ.nd to ••• in on the a1twa-
tion. " 32 
· 
ALDim G. SAJUSEJ. (Chiaf Scout Executive to L1f•) ' 0L1fe to Robert 
Kenaedy wa• • oonstant atnaal• to .s.., cove bhleelf and to help other• 
hlprov• thes•elwtJ . lobert J(aftnedy vnt.ed an end to the atTife that 
Hpuatu "� own peopa."33 
''leermefly u " 4l'Udl\ll. pllblic epu.ur , iaclinad to rapetition ill 
e�tempora�s remark.a. and a •poi'ifle aenoto'MI vhen the te�t ie 
pr«9pared.1134 
.. Kennedy vae a etr� coasplex aan, eae1e1:' to respect than to like , 
•••ier to like eban to u.ter•tandi in all . a un to be taken seT:lOUll ·· 
ly. Ht• love for hUM'nit7 • h��I' nal , Mened ar .. ter in the 
ah•t1'8'tt tbe.n !a iod.irtdual ca•••· He waa no iatellectual 11 but ht1 
v.a aon r9Ceptive to othel" men' a icl••• tUn tGO•t intellect,.161- . ·•35 
_ ...... ..,., _______ ------
,. 42. 
lOJ_bj!. 
31tbtd .  -· 
l2!,!lid . •  
33n,u. 
�......,,..  _"'-
35.reft'Y Saith, ''lobby'• Icaa• ,. "  �.!l!!�-· LXIt (At>rl.1 > 1965) 11 � ·  13l. 
23. 
'1Wbat le a.b ..._..Y ' •  lea�? Oh .. oed �  I dctt' t  k.llOW ?\ow thay' 11 
ttV�luate hia. Uut . l honestly loved tbs r:Mm, You .wuuld heVfl too .. 
h.td yo\S known bim. ''l6 
1'tf �rt lenn*1y .. a � � ,  .. hitioua 1.nd f•talis�ie . did nDt 
i:rus,lr* so U.."l.t'v�rs:J.l m\ acted l"•tJ�n a:i hiQ bl!'othor • hAe 1-:.a<l 11ho'idll hb%­
Mlf eapabl• of gi-oviq aa4 doepeni.ft#.. � flied too yow.np, : th� 
!k-eml�Y f�tly hu ?•id dearly fo<r ita at'doi- fos;< !"'>t.1hllet oorvi�e. 037 
?.o�art �:itf>r:medy an:.S PrMii:lent ;.�on J<Jhnaoo. Wbtch 01.\e would � vr•.flt!!° 
t� !un·.r th� �"Catie: Cou�nti'Ml aeloct'!'')8 The PQll rev•ale.d th"J 
f�ll�ng reaults : 
tn AY8\11St of 1967 1 too s-.e identical poU. wa• �nat. �Y tM.• tl� 
tl,e ??Jblic was owar• ot Keanedy'• ut'ged puce nogotiations �.n V1.etnam� but 
still h�d net h«ord auy umjor �h del1.,.�ed by hi� on tbi• issue .40 
. .... -....... · - - -. - - - - - ·--· _..._.. ... __ .... ____ ...._,..� ......... s , ........ _......_.. _ _..._ .....  __,. ___  _.. __ .�,.--...... _ .. . ,_ ___ _ 
37tWitM'Ul . ''Se.aator Robert F .  lCeuMdy, '1 !:4!!.• XXtV (JYtW 14,. 196€) � 
l> .  G .  
38°x.e.n.nedy-Jolmaan Showdo-,;m � 11 �..!!oP QJ?..t:ntoo ¥�...!!.!!.W.,..,..�� (.Juno , 
19�7) � f> · 9 
39Jbtd .. -....... .... , 
24 . 
�TtONAL OPIMtOtf 491 
Thu ,  ve ,, .. in a period of •ix aoatba, Johuon falling in pruti;e 
and t.e�n.cty rtetaa. 
lft .. rly Mai-eh of 1968 . the .... •�rwy vu coaducted . pl'ior to 
Lyndon John.eon'• qetelon not to run, aGd before the Nev ilap•hire l)riuery . 
'nti• eu� waa alao ooJadGCted after Kaanedy ' •  -.pbattt apeech in Chic.&Ro , 
PebR«t"Y 8 ,  1968� a4 kfeTe hitt apeech ·'eonntct 1n Vietnia" wu deliwr­
lld. .  �arch 18 , 1968. The aoney nvealetl the follovtna l'ffUlts � 
lt\TIOmt OPtNtmt 45% 44% 
't'h••• •tatiatica ehov Johaaon ll in 1Nbl1c optaton f nor befon th• 
var.e Tovealed : 
JOUNSON 
�ATIONAL OPih"ION 41% 15? 
41'�-Johuoo ShowdiDWA, r• O.lJ:!p Optpi,cm ,<er.t!l'}l . I'lde£ 
(S.ptaiber. 1967) . I>• � -
420Ienudy-Jobuosl Showdown , .: �U.op ,OJ?1:e1on ��£•rk IQd,!� 
('.iue"· 1968) . , .  5. 
4 3''Jeoaedy-JohaltOD 8bovdovn, 11 g,.U9 QE.1!!!.� �t'te�li_In<ht� 
(April. 1968) . P• 6. 
25. 
The previous statistics reveal some interesting facts : (1) With 
each survey , Kennedy rose in prestige and (2) As Kennedy' s  etand on Vietnam 
became more obvious , the public seemed to give him more support. 
Therefore, Kennedy ' s  speaking on Vietnam created auch interest 
within the general public, and it seemed probable that the speech studied 
tn this paper, contributed significautly to his support from the general 
puhlic. 
On June 5, 1968, in the ballroom of his Los Angeles hotel , Senator 
Kennedy was shot, minutes after his California victory speech was made. 
It was not the controversial Vietnam issue, that prompted the shooting, 
but a statement about arms for Israel that the Senator made reference. An 
accused assailant , a J�rdanian immigrant called Sirhan Sirhan , was taken in-· 
to custody. At 2 :00 the following morning , Robert Mankiewicz ,  press sec-
retary to Robert Kennedy, announced to the world that Robert Francis Kennedy 
W&G dead o44 
VIETllAM 
!,!istoric�l Backgrou'Qd to .196.8 
Vietnam hae atood uniq�e in all Southeast Asia, as the one country 
with close cultural and political ties to China. Although the Vietnamese 
admired �any aspects of Chinese civilization , their own culture rem�ined 
.ad.,<:)uR.tely distinct for them te resent China '• long-continuing political 
domtnatton. Vietn3meae dis�tisfaction grew and in 939 A . D . , they revolted 
and Hecured freedom from China . 45 
L,4,.A Senator Named Kennedy,''  p .  1 8 .  
45George Kabin and Wm . Lewis , .Tite __ U.- S .  In Viet:.� (New York : Dial 
Pre�e � 1967) , P �  5 .  
26 . 
Af tcr� a century of French coloniAl rule ,, treedo.:a vaa tA6'ain won 
in 1954. In July 1963 � in t.alebTattng the ninth anniversary of inclepen-
dence from Frnnce. !l.ano1 radio illustrated Vletrurar •  utrimnpba.l atrcaal• 
for ind&�endene•'', 46 by bTaokating three v1cto�i•e over Chineae ill"t'ader• 
(b�ginttint in 9�9 !.D.) with tbe 1954 defeat ot the Jrench at Dienbienphu. 
Atter the destruction ot tho VNQDD (Vietnai:i Quoc. Dan Dang OT the 
V1etnem�s� Nationaliet Party) , th• major anti-Preneh unct.rground activity 
ln Vtet'Cllm we uQdet'taken bJ eoemuntat oqantaatiooa .. Three auch grou-pa 
�"'ere united in 19JO teto the lndochtna Ccmmuni•t Party by Do Chi Minb.47 
All during th4l See4tftd World War. after the fall of Prante , Vi•tnMl 
oi Ja,A.n. '4The Preach colonial adminietration which rnained loyttl to 
Vichy French &rut aai1ttain-4 a public ordei- that vu adftntqeoue mAiuly 
fo'f' Japan . we• r..oved by the JApane•e cmly in Mat:t!h , 1945 . 1148 Thia re-
sw1¥al cle&Ted the vay for a Vi.etn_..• national goftrlWet'Jt ,  wbich was 
Thi• govennent lacked botl\ the l'lf.UUUt and the freedom of action 
tc 01tt&bliab it• authority o...,... the whole eoutrtry. ltcN•••�. the 
c:f.rcunstaueee of its formation convinced the V1etrumiese people that 
the end of thf9second WoTld War vould alao bri'Q& them th• and of 
foreign rule. 
In 1�4 ! �  contrary to Vletn ... •• expe-etettOtl, and ta •pite of 
46�. 
4 7.J.b!d . •  
48tbid . 
--.........,_ 
------· ------------ �------- -.. ___ .........._ 
49Joa4!ph lhtttin&GT, 1:h�-�.!';!.l:.l�T Dt:aaen (Nev York: 'Frederick A .  
Pr��1er. 1958) ,  p .  414. 
27 . 
Pttuidellt RooMY91t'• •tl"Oftl oppo•itioa, �· allies a.greed to give lndochtna 
tbe Pranch ·tit"•t l'•toolt tbe Sooth of Viet� by force . In ord•r to �1ain 
th• NoYth, tbey htld to hCOlftiac aDd neaotiat• vttb tb.e new Vietnaaese 
national fiOVU'IUlellt that bad ban in eid.atnce under Bo Chf. Miah. •1.nce 
Autu•t of 1945.so 
Th• llilf.'8'1 VMlm••• of flo Chi Minh '• govem.ent and the political 
we•kne•• of hi• puty a•• the f�ench a tootoho14 :la the Mo'C'th. But vhen 
Dec-1tt r 19, 1946 . t1M.I aoverwnt call-4 on. all it• fol'c•• to "oust" a. 
Thi.a �I', w• by ao ••na &be bqimd.q of bJ.ooclebad in tba 
peet.war atrua1l• for Indochina. 11'19htiug b-.d newr entirely •top,,ed 
•baea the ntum.t.t hwb W •bitted it by cheir tereef W. t'1•0ftl 
of tho aev re91- in Sataou. Ouly thTIMJtb the aul>aequ.nt refusal of 
tM hwb to new ..,.u.u.u •td the actuk of Deaetlber , 1946 
becot.sa tho official beatoatag of t"- lndoehina var.52 
'11&4 pet't.H o! 1946 �o 1954, durltia which Vi•tnaa vaa devutat.cd by 
the OO'St fri�tfv.l. of 11.11 ctolont.al nn, ude up the woret period in the 
ln -4d1ttoa to betna a VQique chaptar of modern s111tary hiatory, 
the I.udoc.hina var wu probabq a1ao �· .at eomplicated ad coafuaiq 
..... __ ......_._ __ . __ _.... _________ ' - -·------- ----- ----- --.. ·-· 
50 !)..!.<!.. • p • 440 • 
Sll)�· · p. 443. 
5211d4. • p .  446. 
2!). 
¢h:ettttel' ia tho polittc•l hS..tCl"f of our tiu.. A C:Ol$t.1141 V'AT t.h.at QMIG 
to h• n1••4efl aa • doel kt..._ worlAI "ec...•1d.•" au "d..OOt•cy ... ; • 
�eOl)-1• ' 5  fitJbt for f� that prO<l� • Coillluntet dict�torahtp tn • 
ntion ef PM4•t•; a JGOTly dteptatd. effo1:'t t.o pa,,,,,_·tuato coloni•lin 
� ..mich the United St•tu 1 to. spite of t.i•r own •ympath:y 'ldth the cause 
o.! the ViAJhlm•• ,.ople , vutJKl foe t.ilUon doUua ; &1ICi! a ooa.tltct 
J.n whtcb .very;me WQ stocd up. for puo• and Vietu.aae iNklpou.dea.ce 
�- ill daq&T of PNMtinl • CGUll8tlitt  ... f� Vt.et ...... " .S3 
On AJJril 18 • 1954 • a joint h'wo-Vte·t•-•• 4Ml•i-ancm at.ate4 �hAt 
Vt•� Ctu ie4epq4� of wlch hw• bu p1'0Cl•Uied t.U � aoMn t.taau> 
qa nniw f�ll;r iar.lepnid•nt.'4 
vtetu..  bl a•inill  flll  •Uonal �--· . lo•t 1� unity to ... 
1•th�t' rith &ha bo1>e tbat -.. end of ooloaialt- tfOUld b11.sa1 al•o a � to 
op't)rueion of all Vutn.••••· VS.th UolW suu.• ttnanoia1 •••i•'IAID:C4. the 
1ovol'ftlt•nt of SM� V1titnn ffttl.t half a •illf.oll nfuaeu ,.,.. tn. Norn. 
built u� • nw naU.oaal • ..., and. -6s.io1••at�.cnl. el.ilidnate4 all J)ro­
coloM.-al and pn-Cot4Wlmlet el.,.t• fl'C8 pHitiou of 1nf1ueoee , hroiut tho 
clur that it iftt•oded w ..,.... in the dil'ec'Uoli of .,.,. fl'eedo.m a1.1d tovard 
th"- erttablitliuent of >j'liabla 4-cnt" 1utl.ht:lou. t:SS 
1-spit• lt• Mqtd.t� , the U. I �  -progre of d.d under the d!l"eetioo ot 
PrNide1.\t !tMahowat' •ly be•ly touched tti. 11we of South Viettt.a '• t:U'ral 
�l'l•tton. Si Mol'•MIM', with tMreo:ef.ng Amer1.cn 1.nvolvnnt f.a Vietll3'l, 
- -... --..,...---�---------------"-· ·-·-.. -11 ..... --· ---· rl--·-1·-·.,··-��··---
S5hruri t. Pall • .a .. , !\!.,�"'!•-�•�!._�- (J.- Yodi: Viutage 




aom. ��ttiun about that country waa dOTW by indt•iduale there directly o� 
i1Mf11.'ectly undes th• &Ult}>it"AS of the lJ .  S .  10V9r1\!!Mtnt. 
Throughout eoet of the �Y Adi:dai•tratton . vt•�nG �ined an 
•tee of a..c:ondery iaporeance to the Untw Stat... It va• o. ptcbln that 
lot!ttetly woTrt-1 the l'natdent but on. to which he Mftr •ewted hl9 full 
attet\t'f.on�56 Hie Adlld.nl•twatton!O ebd.lar to £1 .. nhowu ' e , baeed its l>Qlicy 
upon the ui.ntenaace of a Mpante •t•t• ln Sotith VS.at�. ll• vaa fully 
avai-e ittf. the poe•ibillty of 4oeast1c r•pet"c:ueeto111 .57 
tJ1Km the d .. tb of t>t•. Prl.M Miniata.'C' of th• Prencb contt"Ol1.t 
regil?\a, there appearect .... � poaatb111t1ea for a peaceful sett1emeot 
of the- Vi•� queatioo. M•'• re.owl aleo aff•cted tha international 
scene. Preatdent de Caull•'• offer of Auauat 29 , 1963 .  to cooperate wlth 
the people of Viatl\an in ao effort to unify their countl'Y in peace ·� 
more likely. It va• likawt•• Teve&led at tbi• tiu that Secretary Genenl 
U TAADt auue•ted that the United State• pJ"omote a coalition iO"Nnl94mt in 
Std.a-on to include �i•t ft•t'Oarua poliU .. cal exilu .58 
SboTtly after Pn•idenc John P. k.elmedy \f&a •••aa•inatod . in 1963, 
U Th:tnt llet with Lyndon B. Johnsen and, vu reported to have confty'itd a 
JNasaa• to the P-r.e1d-emt f t"OllJ Bo Cb:l Khb propesintt talk oti a •• ttl .. ll t .  59 
Rael,ington ' s A.daiuietr&!ltioa udo cleat' t te �po•it1on to a ue.utra­
liat aol.utioo. I-s lllid-t>ecet!lber , Defeue Secwetary Robert S .  Mc:N41"ra told 
57!uttinaer. � ·  4'4. 
58ttahio •nd Levie , p .  201 
S9,�\>l4'� p .  372. 
30. 
Sai�on ' s  �ilitary laadera that Waabincton did not reli•h aeutraliem foT 
the country and that Pretaident Kermady'a plAn for withdr.wina Atnerican 
forces had been Hreviaed . ·•60 Any doubt• re1arding th• U .  S .  rejection of 
coll"promise and t.ta deterailaation to pro.acute the var . were ruolved by 
Preeident John.ou'• Nev tear'• ..... ,. to Gneral D\&oq Va" Minh , which 
atated : 
�utraliaation of South Vi•t- wo\llct only be another naM for • 
Com1Uniat t•l'k.e··(')Ver • • • The U .  9 .  will c:oratinue to furn1eh you and 
your p.ople with the full••t o.eacU1'e of support 1• thi• bitter fight. 
aud we shall "41ntain in Vietnaa American ltrsonn•l and material as 
needed to uslet you ill acb.leviaa victoey. 1 
Pruident Keooedy etated ia tu tall of 1963 that the var beloqed 
to Vietua aad that "they are the oaaa vbo have to win or loae it .  "62 
But, as Theodore Sorenaen obaarvad : 
A� we pour tu .ore troops , doetroyin& iu the proeoae th�ir ecoaomic 
$tability more effectively thaa th• Co11111Uniat• have ever don• � it hae 
become our var. We have the lar&••t fighting force and we suffer the 
largest"'f';talitiaa.63 
In lq65-66,  Johntt0n eecalated fro. 20,000 aeu to 375 �000 �en in Viet-
r;uam .  The So\lth Vietna.e•• Army weat fl'Oa 380.000 men to 615,000 men. Allied 
troo'• from oth•� countrt .. veAt up to 30 .000 men. thua a1v1n� a total allied 
atTnt;t'h. of more than 1 ,000 ,000 Mn. "a full-ecale war aachine in an area 
half the eise of California . n64 
·--- ------ --·---------.------- - -·- .. ---·-··· 
60n,1d . 
61Nguyen Vaa-Thai . 
Publiahiug Co11pany, 1960) , 
� Sbort.JIJ.!.t�!..I.� Vi.!tw�I! (Viet-Nam : Times 
'P'P .  257·�287 . 
62nuttinR•r, p .  454 . 
6"nteodol'e C .  Sorenaen, 0rts. War io Vietnams Bow We Can £nd l t: , 0  
!!�rdaz_�9!! (October 21 > 1967} . p .  1 9 .  
64navid Schoeubrun , Vietnam: Row We Go t  In !kw To ('.et Out (New .. * ____ .... . _ __..._."'"_._. __ .::.=:....L .. -,, __ __ .. _ ..• ,. .. _ 
Yorkr Atheneum � 1968) , p .  58 .  
31. 
In 1968, Preaident Johnao11 ' •  State of the Union Meeaage offered no 
proepecta for peace and eftn leea hope was iupired by "the uegati-.e, evaaive 
Washington reaction te a Hanoi prope>eal et the end of 1967 : Stcrp bO!llbina aad 
we vill. talk. 1165 After 11e>nth• of Washington waitio.g for any sizn of peace 
••ttla.ents , they ianored the aigu vban it finally came. Johnson than eharged 
that the Viet Cong offeuei,,. proYed that tlanoi clid aot g.uuinely •Mk peace. 
At thi• p"Oint , the "credibility gap11 widened and citiuns no longer knaw what 
to b•lieve . 66 
Thus . the tragic atory of bow we aot in.olved ta Vietoat and how ve 
thn got deeper and cl•eper into the d.eatb-,ita of that country, from 
th• f1Tst cavtioue Riaenhonr di•patch of aid , to leae4y 'a less pru­
dent but atill noncomittal diapatc.b of adn•ir·  to tbe fateful 
Aatericanisation of the war by Lyaclon Johnaon. 
n1� current debate between 'hawks' and 'doves ' ia familiar , and pres-
sure from both aides growe . There are different opinions about the hia tory 
of tho United States presence in Vietnam which profoundly effect viewA as 
to our "°Tal and legal right to be there . In addition, there are tboee who 
Bl!Y that theae .. tters are ultimately irrelevant, becauee national policy 
muat be determined by the d«tnanda of national self-interest irre.p•etive of 
hi.st.orical antecedent• . 68 Ot>iniona differ u regard8 the preaant govenment 
�s1�1d. ,  p .  60. 
66!lli_. 
67�. , p .  59. 
68bbert S .  811he1aer, Re1?9rt tp the National Council ol__.fhurc�!!. 
(New Tork: Office of the Pre•ident , l96l�, p .  3. · · 
32 . 
and this istl\Ml aft.ctB not only the sno-Tal bui• o.f tha U .  S • •  but also the 
1>bn-pe of no1ot1at1ona for a eettlGIM'at . 69 PrOMnt. aol\ttious are offa� by 
tht'>-'� 't1ho itiah to ••ea.late, tho.a who vtab to do-eff..alate � 300 th0$9 who 
the Am.ertcau Public . !ie ueet'ted : 
'i.'h;e Vie·tnne•• uawl t ,  in the 1oq nm ,  aettle their own pr.oblems and 
d.e'V'elop theil' ovu coutr, vtthout .... 1 .. fel'eigo loterveuUoo (although 
�,ffaiv• •id RAY be noedd) .  At the a-. time, precipitate and un­
uedttiooal u .. & .. vltbdr-.1 voold epeD cba Red to � an•C:•I' claas•f 
e:nd •uffer1na for �ople whose rtaht• of self-d•terataatlen ., justice and 
p•u• the u .  s ..  •••• to .. t forws.n. 70 
ln T•laeioa to tti.•• ct·lff•�inl oplntou , •ta.rtiag ta Ma'-'St of lf)65. 
th� G.nllt>f' Pella aeaducted the .- ••wey "'"ral tim.• thn>uah01•t 196J t 
1966 � ftnd 1967. The 41V••Uoa that •• •ked the a•nenl tNblic wu : .,..In 
v!e;:t of tba d...to,_u atace we en.cued tbe ft&htlQ& 111 Vtetl&Atll. do you 
th.ink the U .  s �  W tlfte woag by Hn4iq. t"°'9 �o tiaht 1a Vietu.t'111 
'nle n&tinal tT4MMS of Chi• Ml"NJ nu u followe r 
AUGUST .,  1967 
RBRUAU , 19(J' 
69t,bff. . p.  4 .  







!IO OPUUON 72 
13% 
16l 
7li''Vietnaa. "  9,!J:.l!p Qj!&!f:e,! Qe.t.,!lI. !!!!• (Sel>�•be� . 1967) , p .5 .  
72!.bl_!. 
13 .. 
TU • MO OPI»lmt 
lfOV'BMBU• 1966 311 .51% 18% 
SKH&MDIUl, 1966 JSl 48% 17% 
MAY, 1966 161 49% 151 
MARCH, 1966 25% S9": 16% 
AUGUST, 1965 24% 61% 15% 
ujarity of th• pvl»U.o npporc.f.ltil the v .  8 .  �•tUon in Vhtnam. Sowenr , 
by A\l..�t of 1961 . there wen ..._ peeple .,..._. to a.Uing Aae1'icaa •l"OO'P• 
into Vietnea th .. u nwaled in ey osbar auney � to t.bat t.imo. Nave.r-
the-1••• · contrMti .. Yi.en �--1-d. fte follovtas pMple c.ouid•r d.tell­
ael'"• 'haka' 4la4 a.pa•• t.belc ttav9 thuly s 
DIAM 'llUU (hcsntMY •f Scete) : 1be v. s .  flnt -11:1.tat-y obJ.cti,,. 
1a � �reveut the o�her •i.de !•om g�111ng a military solut1ou. 7l 
WOV the lw•Tt ot tM matur 1• t What ia Not>th Viet-Ncm •a ollje.etive? 
u it• objttetf.•• t. SO\tth 'fl.•t- . �ban it iG • t aotna to pt 1t , 
•it.bu by atlltary ••• or b7 MSO.Uatioo. NMT. if that ' • th• onl.y 
tbiQii that tbey hav. ta t1ud.r aiad, th.u •he u. s .  ha • lot .owe 
ftabttng on our baede. It'• .. etapl• •• th&c:.74 
WALT ROUOW (SecntaQ' of t'ollt1"1 Attain) I TM Mt44l• Kue :le 
""' 1IUGh lJlca tbe roat o1 what i• called the ' thiri vorl.d • .  It 
1• a S"a&i•• of psaaS.•• ...& yet •f tnatal>tlit.')'. The�• *r• ...., d1� 
tt•ift ton.ea utJ'Ye to the NCHn wbtcla ,.._c • ..n.t and iuter­
-.itteut mrbu18'lM • • • Tunioil oC tbia kiud pr...,..t• the economic 
Md aooul pnaSft*• that atp& w �lwa ...a nm•t• the whol• •nvio-.eat . 
If n turn away trca tbaH m•1.-nt• in tha third W'tld . the :r•­
eult wou14 h .. rtooea ia.n te ou:r fri••• alld to our 'rit•l int.nets. 
If ve hao=• mon actlw, reaul�• wou1c! he favonble. 75 
_ _.,.. , .... .. .. ..... . . _......._ .........,-. .. ----------·-- ---·-'-··-··-------------
73nean tuak, ·'U • . s .  ta�lvnent. in Porcd.p.t Affairs. n !h!.J!g.� u. 
!t�!�.!.�.•!;1-,�!q (Mitch 4, 1961) LVlll, P• l47 , 
74t>ea �k. 1"Vten., ,, !h• .Jl!P!;.1'�!. !!_ ..!t;!t• �'-ll;•!.iA (Mareh 
1 1 .  1968) LvtII . , . 356 .  
75w.alt RCtStov, rr'!he Middle lot Criate and kyond !J n  Ih.,e:t ,DJSru!tt­
!!.!!\LJ __ �.�-� ,hll!JJA (January a .  1968) LvtII. t 'P •  41 . 
34. 
�/IJU. \JH!ltt'W:t (Chat.rMa of the Joi•t Chief• of Suf f) t I • 1a-
olin.d to belifte that by actini u we hove in Vtetn.am , titay <::ell have 
Dertec! • lar�l' cadl.tct at a 1-ter: UM. Hay paoplfl hne po-inted 
out tb'i\ J'rlce w are pay19£ in Sout�t Mia. I think 111e should aho 
rMall Cb• COit to ue of \ln-ld 1'&1' Il - 300,000 .._Ttc:aa dead. aai1 .  
to date , 400 billion dollars. tn thie cou�a.t .  °" espedituna tn 
blood nd treaau.re 1n Vtegnma an placed iu b•tter perepect"iYe 9811 
are 1110re meellingfut.76 
' d�e ' and corm.nt u •�: 
ct.A.RX CL!1P'Olm (S�ret•'fY of Defeue) • Th• U .  S .  policy ft"<m n<J".i1 
on ahould b• to tuni °'°" of the var •ffo1�t o••r to tho foTeea oe 
South Vteulllft. The South Vi••n•••• ••• only ncKI to be supplied 
rith llOden. &1'911 .. Victory is 1W lon,,t: tbe noal. The Qaly hope is 
t� vithdTAW U ,  S .  t�pe , sradually. 
Annnm COLDBID".C (U. s .  &apr.•.ctative to the Unite.cl Nat1.ontt) :  A 
alU.tary eolutioo is not the aMW1'. foT our l)Alrt , we do no.t s .. k. 
to illq)Oe• a ailitn.ry soluU.on n North Viot-N• or ois tu sulheTente. 
17 the •ate c:ott.o" in fidelity to our �taeAt to & politi"l sol·· 
ution, v. vill &C>t per.it lfo-'rth Viet-'Mal and it• adbereuta to t�.a 
• a111tary •elution u�n !ou�h fiet-?•. N•aotbtiou mu8t bQ d'la­
cusaed at all polnc. . 78 
tl1.D SOP.JiNSmt (1ol'lll9r �ial Couuel to Pns14onte Reenady a.'"Jid 
Jotm.en) 1 •'Your goven.ent aboald uuderatand .11 & Ru9•1an 4iplmMt 
••id to .. u " lun.eherl laat Miawtt in Moaeow � "that we at'o ob·-
111•�*' to do for tl.- North VS..t-N .... • Whatever they uk us to Jo. 
lf they ult \68 to Hod �ra , ve wf.11 eoo6 boaU:>or• . If 'they a�k 
ua t.o ...i Mn, ve wf..11 ••nd -· •' Th:t.e ..,... not deltftred as 6> 
tbnat ur wu it a\ii-pl'ieiosly '*'• ht it helped potnt up fol' mis 
tbe •1'Senc:r •f .. ., etopph• Wowld War Ill oov befon te st.art.8. We 
auet �iat•lY begin a vlthdrawal p�oarau. froai Vietttaa .79 
76aarl tJhe•l•r, ''Viet-Nam, n yj�l .!2!t� (Au�t l !t  196-9) 
IXXIV, p .  615. 
77ct.a1.'lt Cliff�r4 , ''The Way O\lt for u. t>. 1o VietGa :' u. s. � 
�w WQJ_ld l!J!O� (May 6 .  1968) Lnv. p .  39. 
78Arthur Gol4ber1 , ''The Seareh for Peaee ta vtet-ll•. 11 TI!!�J���l.­
!.t .. sc-.i._ '3��le£� (March 4 '  1968) ! .. VIII ' l> •  307 . 
79ni*Odore c .  Sonuen , ''Th• Va.- tu Vtatnaa;• ���.., 
(Octoh•T 21� 1967) . ,. 19. 
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lr, l\pril of 1968. a aurYQY 11a1J co9t to �et thu A"8ricRn public 
O"?inl-o-d\ ttpt�1 tiel\lly on 'tlavka ' and t OovcuJ' • T1w l)eMral public \J'a0 ia­
fo�d and o.ffked ;  '·l'eople at'e c-..alled ·� r it they w.cmt t� step up our 
m!H.tacy atfort le Vt.tn•. They are celled 'dovu• if they �•nt to raduc• 
om- military •f fort tn Vatua .. Bow """1d you de11er1b• youreelf . . • ••  
a ;h.'.lwk ' l')l" 'dove? • "'80 Soaae of 'tbe nsv.altns etati•t1¢4 ""�• : 
Hllfl: OOVE NO O'PINIQNBl 
?�AT!OMI. O'PtNlON 41: 41.% 13't 
cot.LEC!i; fttml.tNTS 40% 4)%' 17Z 
91Gll SCHOOL STUDB.NTS 43% 39% 187 
'P!'.f.'1'. & BUS . PKOPLI 39% 44% 171 
FARMFJt' 46! 38% 161.: 
P.E?tr:ltlCA.-.:S 41% 41X 18% 
Dmncv:rs 42% 40% lBX 
IM!>ITT'SliDZ11I'S 39% 43% 197. 
P!tOTESTANTS 41% 41% 181. 
C.�TUOLlCS 42'% 401; 18'1; 
However' in • llOTe h4ent •urny., J-aauAl'Y 1969 a the que•t.t0u wae 
aske<.! th� aeaeral public : 0Some people t:blAk th• tiae h«• co• t:.o bos1u 
tQ nMiuce 1Jt0D.th by t'tOfttb tho mambe1' of U .. 8 .  aold.iora in Viatnara. li.0\1 do 
you fe"l • • • do you think th• tiae baa COffte to d� thie or not1"8.2 Tb.• 
_ _ _ ... ___ ___, _....., ____ _____ ' 
---------- -------·-----� 
,, • 25 ' 
81.Ib!!,. 
82._'Vietur:s� « CAl!ft -��Gel_C@W�IDI ,Ind...!!.,. (JQU4.ry 1 1969) . p . 9 . 
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11\&r'ftY l".rveal.M the f-ollov1Jl1t 
Y!S NO NO OPINI<m83 
MTIONAL Of IN!Oll 51% 28% 1$% 
COLU«m 11'1DlUll"T8 . .511 32% 17% 
ll!GU SC1f00L S'l.'l.11'ms-rt S61 SOI 14% 
no 'F. Alm BUS. PIOPLI JS� 2at 17% 
!<".e\!UW�'1S S9% 26� 151: 
?-ENJ.BLif.":�·t!· S3% JOI 17% 
O�Ti 60% 27% 131 
lNDSPID-inanrrs J61 29% 15% 
�OOTU'tAm.'S 53% lU 161 
CA'raX.lCS 6S% 23% 12! 
too �•Mnl pub11� to aw�lly VS.tbdnaw fHa Vtattwi u op1)4lHd t.o the 
a•••r-1 pvblio $'19p01'ttng u . s .  t.tpctns tn VielUID dvr1B& tlM! YOU# of' 
sr� which Robtlrt r. �mae<ty ..&wcated la the 8'••ch •tvtitcd &a �nu p�r. 
!t appear• obvi:c:N• �t. wb•r• DO -...tfio.i•c fd..,..ly 1>0liclcal bw.J.� 
c•l 90lut:1oae dulnd by Wuhtoa�. "Cn4li.b1ltt.y for political wi11dom \7Ul 
hll't& a gt:•t•'l' Wl�• oa � WJtld WuhtDaaoa .. pu-.. to lead tha- c.red­
ihiU.ty £t:>r dl•poai.na "' ov.nbelaint a:ll1�ry id.pt . ,.g4 ln May of 1968 J 
37. 
Willi.• J. J�ed•r•T. authot: of �r Own Wot:e_�_Rn!!:.t, vuit•d Vietnaa al\d aade 
the felll'Wing COWl!lenta: 
t just retunte.cl fn-. ""I thirt,......fourth trip to Asia, and tlY ninth to\lr 
of V1.etnam. What t sav io Vietnaro violated almoat every1:b1n� I had 
l•arned during •Y twenty-eight-year career la th• u. s .  Wavy, almoet 
••ttrythiq 1 had learned •• a pnf .. aioGal obeener of Asian affair• . I 
beh4'ld t.he U .  s .  beiftll t.eatn • • •  DOt by the atreagth of cbe CDMllJ but 
by its own tsiatakAl9 &NI iocoapetence5 We ha"9 botched up altDOat ••ery­thing we haft atten.pbd in Vietnaa. 8 
OT, tn the wori• of �hin aad Lewi.a: 
If the United Stat•• wish$• to achiav� political ••ttlement in 
Vtetnmn, it must recoani.•• that auy lut!.111 aolutiou aust btl vurked 
out by the VietnuaeH t,._.elwa aad ca111Utt be iapo...t trows out•ide .86 
��x_-•nd tk• C.net'al Ma•Tieaa A.udt�• 
Ao ahown by P'QbU.c Ol)inien -poll• , �ennedy' • P'-'••tiae vafJ increazioa 
at the ti11e he deU.ered "Conflict in Vietna" in Maal!tattan, buae oa March 
18, 1968. The fteMt'al puhlic vu 1D•11nnt.ng to f"l tbat U .  S .  in"VOl,,.....t 
la Vtetntn11 wu vrons � IAlftMdy vaa an advocate ef the "new'' public opinion. 
Aleo, he arT"tvecl in Kane•• with • good rspatatton ae a ••nator and u a 
poltttei&n. 
The .,,..ch wae dellvet"ed Oft the Kanaaa St.ate Untveraity capua, 
Manhattan, 1..at1ea1 . to an aucU.ec• of approatm&t•l.y tourt .. n thou.and . in 
Nicholas �•io at 2 :00 p. • · .  AacoNiq to Vtlliaa w. Boyer , coordinator 
of tbo•• attendiq the occaetoa wel'e 1(.1.U. atudenta , uo'-her 1 ,000 W9ft 
85wtlli• J .  Ledenl', "Conuptioa 1n Vietnam , "  .!!!�!f-�veBtng 
�� (June 1 ,  1968) , p .  32. 
861.a11in and Lavi•, p. 3.38. 
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faculty and •taff, and th• remaining 3 . 000 wen eitiaeu from M4nh3ttan and 
throughout the etat-a . Since Kansas St!\te UniVGreity is co-educational . tlue 
audie--aee coneiated largely of men and women in their late t�eM or early 
tw.enti�a. So.e disnitar1•• euch as Governor Landon . Governor Docking , 
Sen&tor ?eareon an<t ��a . Scott Carpanter wore present .  
!eli$l10� belief• among the audience were mixed and it is uawned 
thnt Kennedy ' s  catholicism was not a eignificant factor involved in hia 
Since Kanaaa State Univet"aity ia located in a 111idwa9tern area , i t  is 
pTobable that aost of the Deatbers in the audienc• had -. coneervative back-
ground . Aleo . aince Kans•• Stat• ie •n agricultural colleae , 1»03t of tha 
studenta probably were horn and raised in l'Ural areu and small tO'lma. 
· Althoush the atate of taoaaa ie coraalderad • Re.publican st&te . the 
audience rec•ived Kennedy most varwaly. Th• audience reeponee seerit4d to 
confft'I'!) the nation.al opinion polla that Kennedy'• pr-.tige was incraa•ing . 
�'841!nator lanMdy. 11 uid loyer • "appeared elated over the enthuaii:t•t1c reaction 
ot t.h� audience. It- wa• the largfft 1:110n.-atblatic in-®or atteadance in the 
hietory of Kanau , and he v•• svamecl over by etudenta . •·87 'Boyer furthe;r 
lltated , "Thouah wie ha'V• 1aad aany f&MUa •P•ak.ers here for tllhom I have been 
r•�pcn$1ble, I hav. MV•r witt:aesaed a a.ore euTi•utte �al or nthu.iaa­
tic t'•s1>0nae to a ape.aker ei�er here or alaewhere , 118-8 
It th"• • appear.cl that Kenedy'• reu,tioi> at Manhattan confirlMd the 
-· ---··---·-· _ _ _ _ ... _ _...__. _. _ ______ ..., ___ ..., __ __ .. -.... -- ------· ---... ---
871Attar frOfl William W .  8oyer , Coord1Dator of Laa.don Lectures. 
}tageaa State Univenity , MaGhattau. lwu, April 24 , 1969 . 
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public opinio� poll• �•l•tin# to ni• rise in �ubltc p�eatige . 
Th8 t"hetorical bi�gTapby G! Robewt F. Kennedy was provided in th1a 
chapter to acquaint the reeder vith 90l!Ml ot the experi•nc•a , training and 
other influences vhicb may b.ave affacte<l his ab1lit1ea u a apeaker. P\lblic 
o�inion of Robert Kennedy was also �tudied in order to deteT'lr'..tne how tho 
r�nerel public view.W ht• a• • political leader . 
In Addition . thta chapter v•• V1'1tten in ord•� to provide the 
Teadl't" with a bTtef history of Vietu• 11nd. T•actions to the U .  S .  involw-
Mf!nt thet'•. Thia vae d.OGe to •••i11t the TeadeY ia undel'etaudiug the 
bistortcal •nd eociological influences on today ' •  l>t'Uent vat" •it1.'A�ion and 
to acquaiat bi� with the �neTal v�bltc vi8W9 of these s1tuat1one . 
1ITom thia chapter. �he vr!ter concluded the following points that 
1 .  A• �Y'• eta11d on V1etn91 l>ec•e lllDt'• obvtoua t the public 
eeaed to give tda 1110ft •uppett. 
2. Vlthia ab• put ,.u (1968-1969) • we He en owr··all de.sii-e 
ft'OID the getM1ral l)Ub1tc to gr&dWlllly withdTaw f� Vietwua. 
3 . Then 8'Y4m appeared to be a t>ap1d move tov.a�d the 'dove ' tnnd 
within a period of the past yoar . 
4 .  h'oa early 1968 co the time he vu ueustnated . Ke�y deliv•r� 
uuy a,-chea ,ertainiq �o hie persoul •tan«il cm the ViettMrl:ll i•sue • 
.s .. tt .... lopflal t.o conclude that the a,..ttna ot llobert F .  
M.annedy aaainat u .  s .  in-volve..nt tn Viama• w.aa a eonaiderable 
factor in bh 1>91:eoul popularity &Gd tn the public op1n1ou o f  
gradual witl\Cfr..,el from Vtau.ie. 
---�----�--�----------�------------��-----··�----------�
CHAPTER IIt 
ANALYSIS OF THE SPEECH 
!ntroductiOI!, 
The speech given by Senator Robert tcennedy aaJ analy&ed in thie 
ehapt&r waa : •conflict 1u Vi•tnaa" delivered at �..aahattau, K.anaas ou Yi&rcb 
18 � 1968 . An audience of approxi .. tely fO\irt••u thouaand atte'Qded , in 
:tlicbolas Gym;naa1\6U at 2 : 00 i• the afternoon .  Aaona thN• attending were 
Gov�rnor and Mra. Landon , Covernor and Mra. Docking , and Senator arul Mrs . 
Pasr&on¥ liO'Wever , approxhuttely 10,000 of the attendance v0re K . S .U$ 
atudenta, another i .ooo were faculty and staff, and the remaining 3 .000 
wftre d.tizan� fr� Hanhattan and throughout the etate .1 l'hat was Kennedy's 
•?eeiftc audience. The aeueral audience was the nation. 
By applyins the criter-U. discussed in ch•pter t .  the speech was 
&nalyzed to ftnswer two buic queotions : (1) Was Robert hnnedy ' s  speakin& 
illtel lisent? and (2) Wae Robert Kennedy's speaking responsible? 
&y liatening to, readin1 and 
outlinin� the speech of Robert Kennedy ,  delivered on March 18 , 1�8, one 
baa!e aea\Ul1)tion vaa diacovered . Kennedy aaeaaed that the United States 
Policy in Vietnam waa wrong. His purpoee waa to abow that unless a change 
did t8ke place in United Stataa involvement , there would be no end to the 
- -·-...--·-·-.....  ____ _ ___ __ ,,_, _ ______ --- _____ , __ 
1tetter from William w. Doy•r , Coordinator of Landon Lectures , 
K.ansaa Stste Uni•eraity, Manhattan. Kan.as , April 24 , 1969. 
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war iu Viatnaa . Accordina to 'lennedy, a reuona'ble 9rogram to end the war 
would include peace aaaotiation.a vith the National Liberation Front t gradual 
withdrawal, and concentration on protecting populated are&G . 
In addition to the .. joT a•••rtion that the U� s .  policy in Vietn.aa 
vao wrongt �eonedy reYealed eeven other VM!in ideas to help his eud! tore 
Ulldar1ttand. the nature of the baeic aa•umption. 
1 .  ���•latioft.S have bTought the u. s .  no cloeer to eucce&e than we were 
befor'1. 
2 .  American control ov�T the rural population in Vietnaa has evaporated . 
3 .  Recently. th• Saigon govel"81111ant 1• no better an ally than it was before. 
4 .  Victories that America achieves ,. will only come at the cost of destruc­
tion for the nation we once hoped to help. 
5. The w11r in Vietn11r11 ta w•ak•nine the U .  S .  position in Asia and around 
the world. 
6. Tho highest price the u. s .  is paying > ia coat in our innel'ftloet lives 
and th• spirit of our country. 
7 .  The U .  S .  muet ftagotiate with the Rational Liberation Prout . begin to 
d.e.e.ttealate the war . and i1l9ist that the OovermMnt of South Vietnar.l 
bro•dan it• ba••, nefore an eu4 will coa• to the war . 2  
The asven 11M11n ideas diaooYeTed in thia apeech , all ba•ically inplied 
th3t unle•- a ehange did take place in U .  S .  involvem.ent 9 the�e would be no 
end to tbe var in Vietn.a. 
relatiGnehip to erldence wa• analys•4 by anewertng the followtn1 queatione : 
{l� What var• the uniqu• and relati••ly arti•tic wayw in which the epeaker 
uee� rhetorical ideas in order to iaply •e.aninga from evidence? 
-----···--- .. - ----- ---
42. 
(2) Did the speaker thoughtfully interpret the evidence? 
(3) Waa the epeaker conscious of the " truth" ae it appeared at a given time 
in history? 
(4) Was it obvious that the speaker was aware of th• necessary relatiom1hip 
betwean ideas and evidence? 
Pertainina to the firat que•tion: What were the unique and relatively 
artistic ways in which the •peak.er uaed rhetori4al ideaa in order to imply 
moaninge fro• evidence? , the writer considered the following two things aa 
uni�U<a and arti•tia eharacteriatica : 
(1) �ennedy adaitted to bi• audience that be vaa }Mtrsonally in­
volved in the early deeieiona of Vietnam , which helped set ua 
on our pr .. eut path. 
(2) � a cabinet aember and cloae conaultant to John F .  Kennedy aad 
Lyndon B .  Jobnaon . he had first band and but avail•ble in­
formation to t� actual fact• of the VietMlft situation . 
In a1l.8Ve�1na the next three quo•tioDS �•l•tina to thouahtful in-
terpretation, ''truth" , and awarene•• of relatiouship between ideas and 
ev1.dence, the writer dealt categorically with ltennedy ' •  ••ven main ideas . 
1 .  "Escalationa have brou1ht the U .  s .  no cloeer to eucceae than we were 
Pertaining to bi• means of euppo�t for thie idea , Kennedy 
used comparison and explanatien. 
All the eecalationa , all the laat atep• , hav. brouaht us no closer 
to suceeea than we were before. Rather . •• the acale of tbe !ightina 
b1u1 increased , South Vietnamese aociety baa becoae lees and less 
capable of oraauiaing and defendina itself , and wo have 1'00 re and DIO?'e 
asaum�d the whole but'den o! the war. In just three years , we have 
Wi>ne from 16,000 advieera to over 500,000 troops ; froa no American 
bombing North or South , to an air eampaign against both , gre.at•r than 
·- -- - --·----� ---- ---� .. - ---------
3Appendix B .  p .  76 . 
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that waged in all tho Europoan theater in World War I I ;  from less than 
300 Americftn dead 1n all the year• lrior to 1963,  to more than .500 dead 
in a single week of combat in 1968. 
Coroparison to three yeara ago and explanation of the present >  were 
uged to reveal that escalations have not brought the U .  � .  clos� to 
victory. Kennedy then implied that the U .  s .  policy in Vietnam was wrong. 
lt seemed quite obvious that Kannedy bad thoughtfully interpreted 
his evidence� 
Kennedy dealt with tha actual war situation •• it existed during 
the time of the speech. Therefore , by comparing this first main idea that 
e•calatione havtt brouaht the U. S .  no closer to success , to the present 
situation in Vietnam . it can be concluded that he wae aware o f  the lftruth11 
as it •ppeared at a given time. in history. 
Contittuing thia relationship between ideae and evidence , Kennedy 
stated: 
We find the d181Hl story repeated t:iJJI• after time . Every time. at 
every cri•i• . we have denied that anything vu nong ; aent more troops ; 
and issued 1n0re confident cosnuniquea . !very tiN , ve have been ueur­
ed that thia one last etep would bring victory. And every time the 
j)redict:iou nnd promlias have failed and been forgotten., and the demand 
hu be�n aade again for jU8t one 1001'e step up the ladder. 5 
Tilus . in dealing vith the firet main idea J �ennedy aeemed to have 
backed it with verified specific e1C4Jlltplea. Kenn4dy recognized the need to 
support his generalization with 8ltplanation , comparison• , and specific 
ex"1uplea since they were probably appropriate in the listener ' s view. 
_  ,._ ,..._ _ -- - - - - - ·--�--
4 
Appendix n .  p . 16. 
5Appendix B ,  p. 75. 
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2. · Aner1ean contml owr the nral J>Opulattoc ha• evaporatc<l . u6 l!e 
used �x-:pla�•tion .and apecific in.etuc-e to stet• . ..  1The Scutb V'f.etnaaft�e 
An;ly ht\S sre•tly ia.creaeed tte tandaftcy to 1"111 its Ch'f)<>UndS in cities 
and tolm8 , ea,ecially at night , reduce 1 t:• patt"Olltnr. and lo.ave the 
Qil1tia snd revolution&l"Y dev«lopasient cadrae open to en•�Y 1ncuTsion and 
attack. "7 
Kennedy 1nterpl'et6d the pr••ioua evidenc. in auch a manQer eo as 
to ·lnfcar that it wes one reason vhy AIMt'ie•n cocabat de1�th - 1049 - W&$ 
iroat�r thnn that of Sovtb Vt.et�• - 357 - over a �•rl<>d of s�veral 
w�ks .8 i:lowev.r. th1e infarenc• •••M<i only a geue�alisation to Kennedy ' s  
ideA th4\t Atlterf.csn contt:ol ove.r the l'Ut'al population haa eva'P'Orntcd . 9 
Thus • there ••.-ed t.-0 b• bum f i'tc.1ent evidence to 8Ul"Port t:eo.Md,·' e eec:c.md 
ide• concend.ft8 Nllarictan e,,.,o�ated eontnl. 
3. "'!'be Saison !JOWmNnt is uo moYe ..,r better an ally than it was be-
fore . 1119 To evp-pctTt thia idu , lennedy uaed ••� epecd.ftc 0�1 .. .  
---·--·--..-- ---.,..--__..._._...._ . _.., _ ___ "' _. ___ , _  t _ _ • . _ ___ ._ _ . _,.,_,,. _ __. .., • ._.,..__ .._ ___ V•_..,..._ ._._� 
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9Appeadil( a .  
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1 .  Land �form hae not ce>me in Vietnam . 
2 .  There 1• •till no total mobil1aat1on in Vietnam . 
3 .  There is still no price or wage controls i� Vietnam. 
4. There i• ao ratiO'llina in Vietuem. 
5 .  The-re is no overtiae work in Vietna. 
6 .  Eiaht••n-year-old South Vietnaiaese are •till not being draft•d. 
7 .  Corruption iu Vietna� hn� not been eli�inated which is � eigt\i­
ficant cauaa of the prolonaation of the war. 11 
la interpretatblg this evidence1 , it appeaT•d that Kennedy was aware 
of the actual eituatious in Vietnam pertaining to land refoTI» , total mobil-
ization, price or wage controls . rat!oninc , overtime work , draft systeln aud 
corruption. 12 One zaeed only check the present hi•tory of Vietnat!i to see 
th4t hie evidence was thoughtfully interp�eted . According to D�v1d 
Scheenbrun. c . a . s .  televiaion newa analyst . the aeven prol>lems ment1ened 
by Kennedy exia t .13 Schoe.ubrun stated : 
Tho Saiaon anermnent i• buically corrupt and it• ecot\Ollic 
stability has worsened since u .  S .  involvement . I t ' •  a ��•tch-.d 
affair, a vaw that ffttl could eupport without the deepe•t mis­
givtnga. 14 
In the pTevioua st:ateaent� Kennedy was conscious of the '1 truth 11 an.d 
thm.tihtfully intarpreted the evidence. He did not rely upon assertion only . 
to win ncceptancfl foT the idea that the Saigon aovernment i• no better an 
ally than it vaa before .  Recognising a need to s�pport this geaeraliaation. 
- - - --- -· - --· -.. --- - -.....- ---- ----· -
11 
.t..ppeadix 8 ,  p .  79. 
13 




he offered seven appropriate apeeific iustaac••· Therefore� be seemed awa.r:e 
of the naceeaary relationahit> between hi• ltay idea and sufficient evidaac•. 
4 .  i•vtctoioies that America achieve•, will ouly eCJOMt at the cost of deatruction 
for the nation ¥(! once hoped to aave . ,,is l.ennedy ' • chief :f.nfe-renee of 
a n.eeder.1 chsnte is •xl)laiued specifically ia thi• idea. Be declared : 
H.'iTdly a city in Vietnam has been ep•red fr01& the n•w �avag�s of 
the put months. Saigon offieia.l.s say that nearly three quarterr:J of 
a milltoa new refugees have been ereated .16 
The city of Hue lies in ruina . 0£ i�a 'fX'>pulation of 145,000t fully 
113 .ooo •r• said to be bC!MMllus . 'l'here ia not el)Ough food , n.ot 
enough shelter , not euou!dt medical caTe . There is only death and 
miaet"y a.ad d .. t ruction .17 
Kennedy 1aterpret•d thi• evidence so •• to use it in direct Telati0n 
with his pro{>Oaitioa that a ohaqe vae needed tu U. s .  policy in Vietn .. . 
Th• fact that �enaedy reasoned froe explanation Mid used Saigoa 
officials for reference, waa indication that be waa coucious of the t't:ruthu 
of th� situation• mentioned . 
Mentio1l of Saigon and HuQ ' .s  present etate pertaining. to food , shelter 
aQd mcdia�l care was used as further proof to convin4e Kennedy' s  audience 
that the. citiee c11noot withstand much more war . Th.is support also revealed 
his >-WartmeS1s of necessary evidence for his m.ain idea that Allll?.rican victories 
will only come at the coet of V'ietn«ae•e destrootion. 
5 .  "The war in Vietnam is "'8akeninz U .  S .  position in Asia and around the 
world . irl8 Kennedy stated thAt the war in Vietnas wae (1) eapping U .  s . 
. -.. � ... - .... _ .... _.. _______ ..._ .. ______ ... � . ... - -...... --p-...__ __  ;41' ___ • _  .._____ -..-..-·-·--......... ·---· -·-· 
1 5Ar;ipend.ix 
1 6  Append L"I 
17 Append ix 
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re�ouTc•& i (2) diacreditiu, u. 8 .  po-.rer pre.ten�iona � (3) alienating u. s .  
allies ; (Li) frAyin:g Ci.a with the So't'iet Un.ion ; and (5) aggrav11ting d1st11an-
thftir knew tM U .  S .  coul.4 Mt a.tford to fipt another A.91.an war while in 
Vietnam.19 
th.at U .  6. poa1tion is wabinitl!. Re stated � 
O\ir atransJe8t and old••t alliee pull back to thei� cnm sbo-ru . 
luvi�ig u .alone te. �lice all of Asia; vhil• '4ao T•e-Tunr. and \\is 
Chine•• e•rado '•lt patiqtly by, ffshtin1 ua to the last Vi.etnanen 1 
watcM.q us weatt.en a nation Which •t.iht haft pr-evided a stout: b.1uT1e't' 
agairust Chtn.•e a:pauion eoutl\watd ; hot>taa that: 11tt will fut"thar t:ie 
oureelvn down in 9ntraeted wa� ia C..t>Ddia. t.aoe , Thailand ; ccmfi4qt .. 
AS it i• np.9Yted from llooa �. that the war in Vlatn.a"a 'v111 in­
e:reasfnlly boi down th• u. s . • 20 
Kennedy onctt qaiu ieterpTeted hie �v::ldeooe to specifically i:mply 
th�t th• u. S .  wa• Qnly hQ�ting itself by continuing alona it• presaoc 
cour!lle.. At thie �oin t ,.  k.#naedy atn an opportunity to •Ute thAt u.nlMt• 
'' tho-;1e who •lt 1u. 1:ba ••ata of h11b po U.r..y are taen who aeek. anothe� 
l)ath, "21 the war will contiaae. H•n ha abt"Uptly 4Mlered : i'And tt is for 
th.ftt t"uaon �at I offer ll'Jtealf u a undidate for Prea1dent of the U� 1 . 022 
l �  
� A.pf>eM. ix 
.20 . � 1 A�fl�l.\tl .lt 
.,l ... Awend1� 
l2 nd Ap�tt . ix  
t ,  � . 8 3 .  
B �  f' • 83.  
B .  p .  �4 • 
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48. 
l\amiedy aunlied at.a•uttul data aDll �1flc tnataoc• with ttat.a 
Uen of the u. I. weauniq poettf.on awl nli-' upon mdienc• acceptance. 
a.ea��• ht. �ntq ideu .. " .-'&'ally bowa ,.  the aidieac• vu .W.jeat 
CC) tl!'Ust hh with the 0&Nt.h11 u it •,,.,..r .. iu t!Ma var •1tuaU.on. 
l.eaae4y t.,1ie4 that tb• u .  I. 
we aainiaa li&c.le. tf anythiq, and ,, .. oaly bdCiq CNS' eo.antry. He u-
ror tho .fiY•t tilM in a centul"J'. w have opn reaiatancc to aeni.co 
tn the cause of th4 nation. !'Or the f1r•t tiae perbapa in our hiatory . 
ve lulv• d•erticnw f roa our umy ou political aD4 110r&l arou.nde. The 
f1"ont paae• of our naw9p&pen show photoaTaph• of American acldier• 
tort\>ri111 J'l'iaoMra . hery uigbt w vatcb borwec oa � ·�- ..... 
Vtolenc• •J>�  ln.e"KOl'ably acr�•• tll• nation, fill1nt OU1:' streets and 
cFlppl1q ou� livu . .And vbatever cM coata co \18 • let u think of the 
youna 1Ml1 ve h�• aeat then : ao� juat the ki llect , but �ho•• we> hn'* 
to kill ; not juat the uill:ed . b'1t alao tboaa who aa.at look •POD th& 
nwlca of what they do. 24 
a. to ,Tobabty gain ack..tlowladpaent froa ht• -.udttore tlMlt 0•11 1• tragically 
�rue '1 and chaq• le oe.•d.ed . The et•temeata ueed h •u'Pport tho 1dq of tth.e 
U. S. eoet in the var, ven oae• that probably would •C be dias-uted by hia 
violMloe wore 1•"" of vhtcb the general public aut brre all been eva�. 
Therefore . ''�ruth" was apparent in relation to tte=�y' 11 eixtb i!Ulin idu of 
U .  s. coat .  
-�··..1---·----·-·-· _.__.. ___ --.-....- .......... .. -.....- . . --------- ----·-- ----- -·-... . ...;.- .-
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49. 
7 .  1'.le caa oeaotiace with th• tilattoDal Lik�attoa FTont . b•ain to deuealat• 
t.be war aad ln•i•t that ca. &Oftl'mUt of Seutb Vi•t- lmM.den it• baae . 
institute tul r•fOl'INI , and n•k aa bonor:-able ••ttlen.ent with their fellow 
c0tt-atrpMta. •125 K911D9dy ueed no nid.enc• to d.ev.19'>. thte proposal. Other 
than ue•t:ting that hi.a pngra vaa the auver t.o '�What Can �. Dot" ,  he 
offered no .iapU ... tatioa - "° v.v• aocl MAU � Cft'rYk.& ovt Cha p�opot1al. 
P•rhap• . be waa ware of the tim.e el-.nt invohred � as be ha4 only forty­
tive miautu to apeak. 1.9'.oDedy UJ ba•• decided it vu be•t not to ,. into 
tbe pro9l'Hla •t All rather than aot C.0'11Cl' thea euffle.teutly . 
•ue•tieu wen ....,. .... ' (1) How did the epeabr octa,t �-1.L� the audiancef 
aad (2) uow 41d tu •ve•k•r adapt hie .�!!. to the at.Miie'Dfft 
As ftVM!ed ia chapter It of Ota eh47. laeudy wu kptmi"I t-o 
cli�b in ,..lie pn.tls• at tM tlM be 4M11vend thie epeech f.a Manhat-tan. 
lane.. . The�efon, be vaa •rrf. viq ill � .. with • aoQd nputatiOt\ u 
!ilaoatol' .uW pol1tic1a. Also , u •bovD by th• \)Ublie opiniOI\ poll111 . the 
tOneral l)Ublic •t thfl time Of Kennedy ' •  Kalle .. apeech WAa beg1nniua to feel 
th•t U. s .  1avol-...eat i,. vtetnaa vaa wrona . l t  vaa piobabl•. tberefot'e , 
tbAt botit tbe _,,eaker aad ld.• id... f 1 t qry well into the audience betna 
Ndrueed . 
lennecty ahoved hi• gcod-ri.11 for the audience at the ••i"Y be�inBini 
o( ht• •J>Mdl vben he ue•rted : 
···-·-....... -..... -. . -· , ,. _ ____ ..._,,......._ ..,., ..... ·-------
2SAppendix I ,  p . 1.5 .  
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50. 
Tho re .. on l '• h.et'e ia that 8omoM ••• M a Metotry of thi• etc,.. 
hind ! found out t'hac lt v.as f'oWlded by �le from Cllicaao "110 cama 
to ltaoeu &o fCKMd a towa as 1d ao.1oa vkicb the1 lat•T chaoa•d to 
l':fanbflttan. So I tmw I ' d  b• riibt at home . 26 
1 met Goftnor· LandOft at the �tt.e UOUM wM:n n. .Uttad th•re . t 
kAow ..._. iaiahlJ hMidu• l.e•ei7 1"..,..Cei tlMl Oov•ltDOC, and. tba 
contimstng eontrtbution h• •da. and •till &&bu .  to the public life 
of our eou.atiy. 'i..1 
b•fore be eoMnd iuto � oenn&l theme of hi• ep.-h. 
Aleo, oae f1Me 1a �eAIMMl1'• follGl!daa 11ta••ent .a ab.ow of ;oo4'1rill 
It iuy bre tlult our vi.ewe o:a this war will not be in agre•twnt,. but 
vllat ta :1a,_rc..t '8 tbat we 4lta-.a oul' view . 4le...- the fac••, J&ad 
t� ••k •thn&tb in the eodul'1Q& iapul••• vb.1ch have always united thi• 
utioa • • •  io cbe faith tbac ,,. aa �tune� t.o,.lber, ... ••te• a� 
br1aa to ou.tr eervice the euonaowt forces that rap acro.9• the world in 
""'ich v.e ltw.lS 
•ltted co &hes h1a tnYOlveMD.& la the .... 1,. clectaio• of Vi•�. vbte.b 
belped ••t • oa our pr• .... path. Ha futhM atteap•ed to ....... 1 hi• 
&ood ebarul•• by MYiaa . 01 - w1111q to bur "'1 •hare of t.� reepou:l-
hility. Min• bi•towy and kfon ., f•lleW'-oitti••· ht pMt •rJror u M 
UCGH to• lta - ,..,.cuact ... Mi9 '?hia •taC-.it ])'Cobably all0tMd the 
t• -�-------·--------------------·�-.. -·-·- ·-·-·-· -·-•'. ·----
s 1 .  
vu � HO!lf <lid the a,.Uer adapt hie idea• to the -.di8'4C•f 
Kear.edy •••-.med tbac M08t AltltrUaM beUeY84 in peace. The 'i14¥' ta 
Vlotaaa •1olat9d tut AMrtcan klaf. � .  �1mect, . ta the folloving 
quot.U.cm ceueci..s hie 1n:opos.1 with value• uld bJ awe llllllbera of tb• 
TM va� INlt be made.& •  � it can be �..i. in a � of brave 
�:a vho h:eft fougbt each other with • t.en:1ble fury., u.ch belio�"'"ins 
he am be •lo• vae .... the rif,ht. �- b&ft pr•yed to 4lff•�•Qt aed• . 
and t.he prayes.-s of n•·ither tuavo btaan al.\llNel!'ed fully. � • while th�r� 
1• •1111 time tor .. _. ef t.he9 to k partly ..... .a . now i• th� itrae 
to StC"p . 30 
c:i�vectly to thei� bu1c duir .. foir ,.,."Ol'ld peace. He further atated : 
Thi1J ts a yMr of cm'>i.ce, a y,M-r when we ohoo•• not •1ll ply who �,ill 
lead ws .  but ,..re we vi.ab �· be ltl!Cl; the councry we vnt for ou�­
Jt;t'lvetJ . .. . cmd tho \dnJ we vant for our child'l'ea .. 31 
51m:e t!l9 audi�raee c-ouiated chiefly of collep •tudenta 1tnd tb•ir 
parent&. it 1& p'ICbAblo that the pr...,ioua aut-..nt nl.atod closel�l to their 
own peraonal dest.r .. ozwi kliefa .. 
ltannecly reflected arowing &:nabte about the wa� wbMl be S4id : 11All 
would et.asid v1 llin,ly. if it •"'11WM! c.o Hl"'H 80IM worthwhile end .  tt32 
ll1ppewiis B ,  p .  73 . 
32 ApJ*Mlb ll .  p. 85. 
52.  
ln repwd to the pnaent sttuattoa in Vi•tneai lannedy tetro<luced soae 
gllJWt:'Ally kl'tOlft.'I point• of 1afonaclon aftd value judgmnts: (1) Atlerican 
�ont�l tnrer tbft TUra.\ populat1eo has naporated � (!) �e¢alltly" the Satgon 
�W-l"nNl!lt 1• no b9�ter an ally thao it v.• 'before ; (3) V1.etc1'1e.9 that 
America achiavea . will only c.-. a t tba c:oec of 4estrueti.oo to-e the nation 
w ON:e b� to .... ; (4) 'nle war i• weakening u. s .  poeition 1n .Uta. and 
aTOttad t:he Wl"ld � alkt (5) The hlih .. t �nee the u .  s .  i• pay1na . 1& co.st in 
our tn�t liw• .vi the apirlt of ou.r co\Httr,.33 
'l'herafon. bee&•• t..lw war tasue vaa a topic all'eedy heavy in th• 
�is•d• "f 110SI. of hie listenet'a . l'.annedy could apect • f avorabla rupcmee 
to hi• •lue j\ICllJINOt• .J>out euni.Yal of othen , Mlf end CO\tlltry. Be­
C.UM idll-loe. of '-riaan U . vu al1ll h1111oNI of Aned.can dollat<s wen 
i�)volv6d bl tlw Vi•tn• •J.t\Ultlou, one could likwi.ae •••'llMt tbat Kennedy' •  
ptv,,a:i•la f.or t.,r<MHMnt wen acoe'pt.ad by WMDJ .  
Kennedy atn•Md � if no ch.a.np took plau in their policies in 
Vtetn• 1 t.�H tfOUld only be '•r• AMrican• killed ; lllO'l'e of our treu\lr• 
8f»i11M �.1t; and 1110r• t,hoooande of Vi.etn•••  elataghtet"ed . ••34 Ha e.ndod 
this di.ract d1Hu.•1ou by emphatically atatin3 . nl do tlOt think. tb18 U 
whAt thet 1'.au"ic.an aptrtt ta really all nbCNt .  n35 Thia aut.-ct olx>ut th• 
.Aattricen IJl)irit . wait aet\ttoaed in •1ailar fona ttOVel"•l tf.Dff th�oughout 
h1o a,e1teh. l'J'Oll th• 80\tnd ef au.dice• �J..-. on the tape ncordinst �f 
the •PHCh . \!tran9d.y h.Mt eloeely n.aehed the va.luu of hi• bearers. 
33Ap�1x », p. 7$-85. 
34Ap}'>Udb E ,  p .  74. 
3SAp�endix B ,  p. 75. 
53. 
n..�ouahout hi• di•cuseion of the pre•eut problem in Vietnaa, K.esanedy 
at:lmulated hi• auditor• by uaiilg atatements that probably i-roduced an 
..otional impact. Tb• foll.awing, are exuplee of thoae atate�rits : 
1 .  Military revenale have led the u.  � .  to aak for 206 .000 more trooJ>• 
in tho last aix months . 
2 .  kaericao caaualiti•• ha'ftl gone froa leas than 300 dead in all the years 
pri.or to 1965, to ..,re than 500 dNd in a aiqle week t>f combat io 1968. 
3. Eighteen-year-old &o.th Vietnaae•• are still not being drafted . 
4 .  geuth Vietn111Mt•• corruption has not been eliminated which ie a aigni­
ficant C4&U.• of the prolongation of the war. 
5 .  Victories that Americana achieve, wtll only come at th• cost of 
de9truetton for the nation we onee hofed to hel� . 
6. The war ie veak.ening u.  s .  poaition in Aaia aod around the world . 
7 .  The hish••t p�1ce the U. s .  is payina is co9t in our innerll\Ost lives 
and the epiri.t of our co\11\t.ry. 36 
0Ra could asaume tbe audience to have poa••••ed a great deal of 
indignation and revuleion at the 111eation of all the•• weaknaeses . Hie atate-
JMnt pertsinina to 11ilitary reversals muat have made the audience awa-re of 
juzt how many troops Aaerica has in Vietnam . In direct relation , his second 
atgtemant , infot"ft'ling of co'l'llbat deaths , surely made thetP realize how little 
good all theee troop• vere doing to brina the war to aa 'end . Since there 
were tu!veral colle$Je freebmen and their parents in the audience . it can be 
ass1Ull4td that th• atat•Nftt • "South Vieta.ae•• eighteen-yea'r-olds are 90t 
being drafted , t•37 •truek pretty clon home.. Th• fact that eo!'TUf)tiou tn 
South Vietnma baa not b••n elbd.natad , apin, maat haw Mde the audience 
wonder just vhat good u. S .  is doing ia Vietnam . When he •poke of American 
--------- ----- -- __ __ ____ _ .. __ _ 
37Appandix U ,  p .  79 .  
54. 
so little abeut South Vieball that w. aie willing to au the land de..•tr.oyed 
and its people dead ., then why are ve tl\4tre in the first place?n38 /\t thia 
point . audian<:• applau•• vae so outataindtae� that it vu •everal ainutaa 
bofqr� �e.tui\ed.y vu able to TH_. ep.Mlttns. Uta sixth appeal,. that U. S. 
i• beoomin� weaker 1� the eyes of A•1A and the whole vo�ld certainly umst 
b�v• continued to pet•uad• bt.s auditor• that U .  s .  inval�nt in Vietnaai 
pby�de4tl price the u. s .  vae r•Y1ua for t� Vtetua w&t'. When he etated 
that Nt'e U.ve• find epirit• ot the Aiurlun people al'e destroyed every hour 
due to tti. Vt..tnaia wwr . R.ennedy .ateed the concert\ of eome p•rents 8nd 
•tudanta vithtn the a\&d!Aance. 
'lbus. 1t vu probable that Xeaua4.y 'e tll)e��i ia•t1llecl a fM111\f. of 
pointed O\lt the p1:0bl•• · r•lated them to baaic beltel aye�ems , Mtl1 th"' 
aud1eace ""tad . Tltat �liehed , ha aoDCl� hia apeech with a final 
plea for ch-aap and l'Tdbcbly with little dou.'bt in the •ind• et hl• ll•t•n ... 
•s that a chaage wae need ,  Be •1" iltpU.ed hi• """ c.,,Otlitl•s of 
In the uxt etaht 110nthll .. w ••t 4ecstde what thU eouatry Will atand 
for • • • and what kind of -n v. ara. So t uk for your help p in the 
eltf.••· to tM boae• of thte etat•. iato the tOVlla and ta1Wt: cont.r1-
buti1)! your conc•l'D and actioa, waning of th• dauaer of what ve •n 
doiq • .. • ancl the pl'Oll  .. of what we cu 4o. I uk you. u ttma of 
thouaaad., ot yout\I un and VCMHn are do1Qg all over thill land . to 
-... - ,.....,......., -�· -r• •...,lll;-·•--------------...., ....... ...,_, __ ·----·--------
SS. 
o't'p.nftige youl'••lne aad t™m to go forth end wcrk for 1stnt policie• -
work t� ch•nge our direction.39 
hi!'\ttelf to th� a\ldtenee . Ma idMs about tM V1etnam issue tret'e a�ndtt.d 
country. gyen t�tt within the audieace who iaay not ba'f'e qr._ed vi. th 
Analysin� audieee adaptation. included l&arfting 'P•Hf}nal reaetiotu 
to �ennedy baffiat;ely preeediott the Metre•• · Mt'. William W .  '°Ye't , �<'ordin-
vci hav• had MttT faaous spesbre here for vhot\ I b4ft been ruponaible .  I 
have n�er trt.t"••a� • 110re chart ... tic appe-.1 OT enthusiastic re•p<>na« to 
a &p&abt' either hel'e n •1•.wb.en . , .. 40 
th�!!t ·.niter tirt.tt noted his 41Wf1re.ne•& of th• 1u1oial ccmseqiwncefll of his 
� ch. 11d.• was done . by �wsiderina how r.eo.lte tically V.ll!ll'ne.dy de.alt 'With 
t.O Letter frem �!lU.am w. �yer . Coordin.to'I' of t.ftn.don Lectures ,. 
Jf..«na�H:t State Un1'vera1ty 11 Mn.hatt�n. ii'anau , April 24, 1969. 
56. 
Militarily , Kennedy aoat likely hoped that his speaking would llU.lke 
hi• auditor• aware thAt th• var v&a not siaply a military criais. Re 
stated : 
We have looked upon the cooflic:t in South VietlUUll u juat a military 
conflict. It ia �� ju5t a military conflict - it is a political and 
dipl01aatie conflict a'Ad we have i&n<.>f•d thoae two areas . That 's why we ar« in the trouble we are today . 4 
Thus , by attempting to take e111pbasis off the military aspect. Kennedy 
ho�P-d th� consequences would result in more awareness from the general �ublic 
of the political and diplomatic fault11. 
Economically 9 Kennedy no doubt hoped that tbe reeult of ltis spe•cb 
voulcl at least open the •Y•• of hia a\ldito�a in tel'IMI of the price U .  S .  
is paying . R• asserted ! 
All this • • •  the d .. truction of Vietnam, th• aoet to ouraelvea , 
the danier to the world • • •  all thie w. would stand willingly , if it 
ae� to ••rve ao.e worthwhile end .  But the coats of the war ' s  present 
course far outweigh anything ve can reasonably hope to gain by it.  for 
oureelve• or for the people of Vietnaa.42 
Kennedy refared to ''our ianenioat livee and the spirit of our 
country. H43 He illplied that. the only conaequencea that would arise from 
hia ttrogi-am of withdrawal would be more lives aaved and mr• apirits en-
lightened . 
We ••• that ailitarily . eco11011ieally and per•onally. ttennedy w .. 
lll09t likely aware of the coneequencee of Ma epeeoh. Ile was probably con-
ftdent that no aoneee(U91lc• coald ruult in worse action than already ezieted. 
---
41Af>pencU.x B ,  p. 76 . 
42Ai>,,.adb B .  'P .  A5. 
43Appondill s �  p . 94. 
57. 
ch-ttd.'!tanle, 1t uas pectusary first.. to define t.be tvo turms v A.ccording 
to Nc&b Uob•t•r. a dent3!,0t;UC i.e "cm,e who meeb to piu personal adwntago 
by ��c.ierut.i Ol:'. e:xtr.rn.gant clahs . '?t'ozlaoa . or charge.a. 1144 iS'•bst$r said 
$ CnATl#tam :la c.oOM who Nk•S ehotry or llOUY preteneea tc lmowledge O't 
Ab1lity . "4.5 
rt may b:• that CNr vteva on this U<&r will tlQi be in agre&:�nt 1 but 
wh.it.t 1,$ i�rtant 18 that " di•eu•• our viwa .,. diacuss the fAct•� atui 
then :..oak •t.r.e.nsth in the enduring ll\pula.ea ,fhicb have always \tn1ted 
this 1l1i!l tion • • • 1.� th• f�dtb that we a• AmeriC!&tts. tor.,ether � ;:•n 
mctatlJlr and brf.q to our een:J,ce th-e enormous fore•• that rage .ac�c>:fl$ 
th� �'l'l.c! to �ieh· we U:ve. 46 
m�nird sM by tennedy 'e p.oli·tic;al and •�ic ncurtty and his pr<lvious 
b.umAn1.tttri..an utt•-rancee about Vi•tMm.. Alao . tbcn.�o w.a• no •vtden.�e in 
Ktm.nftdy' $ trpMCh of ewtr�wtnt cl•i• . p'n::ai•oa , or c.hal'gu . All hts idne 
Ke.llne4y•s u•• of e.idene• and �ns to eon.etruct lo3ically cogeQt 
arg,�ttta ,  rt.lUe out ·tbe ;oeaU>tU.ty of hi• beia.t a ebai-1atn. A.130. oae 
41\,.bster, p �  1082. 
45web8tor , p .  973 . 
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advocating pea�• are far from charactaristics of a charlatan . 
N:f.cholae Katsenbach made a statement about Robert i:enuedy , that 
al•o �ided in iuveatiaating the intslligence and responsibility of Kennedy ' s  
speakins; : 
Bob KftODedy ' •  career 48 a reporter and a speaker was abort and 
probably contrived • • • but hi• p .. sion for the FACTS • • • for tel-
1 ing it aa it is • • •  wa• as great aa Ed Murrovs. They vere friends 
• • • and autual admirers • • • and they •bared a paaaion for !h• 
best 1 1 truth'1 aTailable • • •  brutal , unvarniahed, aood or bad. 7 
Conclusion 
· -·---
There are several couclusions which can be drawn after the analysis 
of the speech of Robert Kennedy given at Kanaaa State University, f1arch 
18. 1968 : 
1 .  From Robert Kennedy ' s  Baawaption that the United States policy 
in Vietn11111 wa• wrons a�d from his following seven aain ideas , 
one could deteraine his apaakin8 !!!,!lligent . Kennedy ' s  
•e•en 1D81n ideas were: 
a .  Escalations have brought the u .  S .  no closer to succeaa than 
wo were before . 
b .  Aiaerican control over the rural population in Vietnam has 
e•apo't'ated . 
c .  Recently . the Saigon government ie no better an ally than it 
wae before. 
d .  Victori•• that America achieves , will only come at the coat 
of destruction for the nation we once hoped to help . 
e .  'nle war in Vietnam ie weakening the U .  8 .  poeition in Asia and 
around the world . 
f .  The hiah•et price the U .  S .  i• paying, ie cost in our inner-
110at live• and the spirit of our country. 
g .  The U. s .  auat neaotiate with the National Liberation Front . 
begin to daeecalate the war. and ioaiat that the Government of 
South Vietnam broaden ita baae . before an end will cGm. to the 
var. 
Ttieae ideae all basically implied that unleaa a change did take 
place in u .  S .  in-.olvement ,  there would be no end to the war in 
47Nicholas Katzenbach , .. Violence ," Vi.�al Speech•• (August l s  
1968) , X:XXIV , p .  615 . 
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Viet't\&\m: Th• idaae were a.ppende'1 to sener.al American beliefs 
about war . peace, .Ut'Vival of self and of country . 
Al•o, Robort Kennedy ' •  •peaking can be det.entin� !.�!.11!&� 
by his expressions of good-will aad demonstrations of good 
character . 
2. �obert Kennedy ' s  speakin1 ean be detertained !.,.P.!P_•J!>J...!. from hi.a 
warenttaa of •111 taTy, econoatc a1Sd pe�aonal eon9.equ-eac.tul of hi• 
••••ch. Also, tn.re ·vu no evidence of f..•nnedy revealinu 
charaetertatic• of • d ... ao1ue or charlatan. 
3 ,  Aa ahc:Ml by public op:l1licm poll• � it 1• na•uble to Q9\llM 
that Robert JtAannedy' e  e-peaktna on th• Vietnam 1e•ue enhanced 
bi• personal and political popularity. 
tl1.at ef Senator Rol>eTt r,. leanedy. 
It vas the bypotheaia of thi.e awdy that &oberc 'franois tr.ennedy ' a  
Manhattan� lauaae on M&T:eb 11, 1968. 
fo� the following ru•oae : 
l . • The a9eecm etated a cleu poeitioa • leu.edy'• stud i­
Vietnt.m . 
4 .  The a,e•ch wn.s credited with lAUnehina Kennedy'• presidential 
c..,aign. 
us•i by T•u Kawa Alpha in Al.acting their recipient for Spaaker-ot'-·tbe 
y� awarcl. 1 Also aeeistiaa the author 1n forming crit.ed.a were Albettt 
1HTau lappa All>ha Speaker of the Year Critei-ia •" �.JR!.@! 
(CTawfo'tdsvtlle , Indiana, 1955) . 
61. 
Croft's ''Th� Function Qf llbatorical Criticistt /• 2 Thou.• Nileen 'a 'llnter­
pretativ• 'Function• of the Cr!tic , "3 and Thorua1ten aa.d laird ' s  '1Speecb 
Criti.f:i.e�1.  �·4 
th� a.nalysi.e of the ••lected epee.ch : 
t .  Uaa Robert lCenoady's •P•akina -��t.!..l�!&!!!.�t 
A. w"bat wre the u•uaptiou "J'01l which t:he •Pffch waa b�a•d'l 
i. What vaa the apeak•r ' • purpoff •nd what were the matn 1.Qoae 
••t forth in the speech! 
c. Were the id ... vananted by the evid•DC(! uaed in th.a s,eech? 
D .  Vara tlMa idea. v.U adapt*1 to the! auaieoce? 
Il. Wae Robert leundy 'a apuk.iog r .. ROJ\8,1.b!_!? 
A .  DiAJ the speaker revul an avarenaaa ot the social cou­
••ct•GCff of his •pachf 
n .  Hu the aptreeh tr.. fro11 deu,goauery and chat'latenis� .iae ahwn 
by content . lang\&a .. . and <leU.veryt 
Dy lis�nina to. re•diag and outU.nlQ3 th• e"41ecb of Robert Kennedy , 
delivered on March l& . 1968. one b.a•i� aaawaptJ.ou was discovered . Y.�rm�y 
UtnttMt� that the United Statu policy 1n Vietna!a vas Wl'Ofti. tie also re-
_,._ .... ... � .... . ....... ,� -. .. _ _ _ _ ...--------... - � .... t ' ... ,. ..,. _ 
__,. __..... ___ ______ ,., ______ .... _ ..____ ,.._ .... 
2Albe-rt J .  Ct"Oft. ''Tbe P\Metione of Rhetorical Cl'itici• , "  
9-_���Mk.�� of S�h_ .  UXtl (Sl)riug . 1'56) , p .  l9. 
�bOlilU t\. Nilaeu . !'laterps-etatiM J'uactiou of the Critic. �· ·  
!!!.�!J-!� . .!Y. .  hA. XXI (Spriaa. 1957) , P• 70. 
4Lestar Tbouaen and A. Craig Baue, S2e ... ch Critic:i&l! {N� York� 
Th� R�nald Pres• C0111)&nYi 1948) . 
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1� �l.!ealatiou have b'J'ou1ht tbe u. s. eo oloeer to eucceee than we we�e 
befc,T•. 
2. Aotertcan control o-.ar the Nl'&l population t:n Vietnam baa evaporat•d .. 
3 .  Rccent.ly, tho Sain,on gova'?'mt&nt ie no better an ally t.rum it vas 
befor• . 
4 .  Victori .. tbat �ric.a achl ... • ,  will only coae at the coet of de•truction 
for the nation .,. once bepecl to •ave . 
5.  The wa� in Viet'n.«M ia we.luiniQg the U .  S .  position in Asia acd around 
th.Cl world . 
6. Th• h1�h .. t pS'ice &be u. S .  1• '31'-'�· l• coat ta our inneraaoat ltv•e 
aad tbe spirit of our country. 
1 ., The U. S .  auat nesotiata vi th �be National Liberation Fron t •  bes in to 
daesc4l•te tbe wu, sad iuiet that! tbo go.,.rmuant of So\lth Viotn.u 
broaden its bae.e,, before au end will CQ\M to the var.5 
The seven nwain ideas dtacovered 1r. thia speech , all baaicalty ta-
� no end 'tO th4l wa� in Vtet'Darll. 
Af�et diacoverin& Jtennttdy' e  11ain ideas . their Telattonahip to 
evidence was analysed by auwerlna the followt.ug queattons : 
1 .  tfhat were tbe uni.quo attd -r•lad."ly artt.tic vays ia which the 
•peaut: used rhetorical idua 1t1 ol'dal' to imply iaeaniQiB from 
evidence? 
'.L �•• the •�•r conscd.cwt of the "t:ruth'1 ae it appeared at a 
1iven time in hietol'Yf 
4 .  Wu it obTioua that the speaka_. vu eware of tlwt Qa4lfl••ary 
relatioa.hi� betW'IMt.8 Mleae and •Yideoce? 
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In ord�r ro ef!ectively evaluate Kennedy's meana of eupport� th• 
of t� 1.nstancu , th• "Wt"iter found aufficient evidence 1D s�port ol 
Kenn�dy ' •  main ida.a.. The two instances weTe i 
l .,  'n1ete Homed to be inetiffieient evidence te su9port Kon.na4yrs 
tdea ocmeerni•J' Aeeriao e.apo'l'ated coatrol over the rural 
area• of Vietn . . 
1. .  Ke'Qt\edy offered no 1�li�•nt.ct19n - no W•Y• •nd •�•n• for 
c•n-yina out ht• propo•al .. that va ahould. aeaoUate wt.th the 
l�tiotaal Liberation hont llnd beiin to deucal•t• th• lMr .. 
r.o evaluate Kennedy' s  audience ndaptat!on , two baaic queationg 
ancl (2) Rav did the •peak.er ade\)t hts ideas to the aud.1on<:e7 
--· 
It vn.11 concluded that SG'M.tor Kennedy ' s  audience. &!daptation \fU 
intellig-ent. ay upree•ions of eood-will and dtmemstrat1ons of co� 
auniv.-,1 of solf and of country. �ven thoae wi�'dn the audience who may 
•ot1onal involveeeot u he pot.at.eel out the probl•s . 
th$?' author ftTst noted ht• swarftneas ct th• soctial c:ons�ee.e of hts 
wp•ech . 'nlia wae done by couidering hCKr. realistically 1'.enN"dy <le.nlt 
... ..... - . ._ ..... ., �  ... - ------· -..... - ...,._· t • · ------ - � ...... ....__... -............. .. , __ ..... , ... _,....,.......,..� ,, ....  _. ...... ........ _ . ..____._. ·-·--···--
<'t h1e 9p�ach . It wu discovered that nU.turily,. economically , anl! 
personally s f..ennedy waa aoet 'P•ohably nan of the •octal eonsequenc:ea Qf 
odv�nt&�na vith the '11.atl\aa 1aeu.e. TlMa peaatbil i cy  of poU.tt.cel det'IMI-
ill hi• id••• ,,.rtained to 1aeu•• ae tile? accually e.d,ttted 
in Vietnltll. 
�ermedy'•  uM of .-ft.deuce and naaotdng to coutl'UCt l�tcally co·-
Ag reve.4le:i in chapter !lI � thor:e ar• eew-ral conclu.d.ona which can 
State t.Jniv•ra1.ty, March 18 ,,. 1968. 
1 .  From Robert lannedy•e •••umption that the United States policy 
1n VietftlM waa o;nong and fl'01t hi• follawilla seYeO •in idea•., on• 
could t1.•t•m.1ne ht.s &'PO&kina ��ill.!I!!!,. ii:enMdy ' s seven 
ad.n idu.e •re: 
a. &tt:•latton• have hr�bt the u .  s .  no closer to auccesa th11n 
ve \lt-eH before . 
b .  AD.M'ican control oveT tbe. rur•l population in VietMO ha• 
•Y&$)0l"&t•c! • 
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c. R�ce-ntly, th• Saigon ioveTn:lMnt is no b�tter •u ally than it 
oss before. 
d .  Victori•• that .\mer1c& achiev•• · will only corae o.t th• cost of 
detttruetioa for the nation ve o.nce hoped to help. 
� .  Th� war. in VietllA91 is weakentnn the U .  s .  �osition in Attia &nd 
sT�Ulld the vorld . 
£ .  'nle hiF,.h .. t p�ice the u .  S .  i• �ayln$ , ta cttet in �ur 1.nner­
aost live• and the spirit of our countTY. 
e .  The U. s .  3Uat oeiotiato with the National Liberation Front , 
begin to deeecalate th• war , and 1o•i•t that th• governaw.mt of 
S&uth Vit1tna3 broaden 1ts bue. before an end will ccae to the 
WAt' • 
'Theu idMa all baet�ally 1tni>lted th•t unleas • change dt.d take 
place in U .  s .  involve�t . tbe.l'e would b• no end to the war in 
Vietuam. 'nte id.u vere appeoded to general Aoet>1can beliefs 
about waT , peace. aul"Yi.val of s•lf and of count-ry. 
AlflO# Rob•rt KenM<ly " s  apeaktna can be detera1ned int•lliR� 
by hi.a oxpr.ssiona of sood-w111 and c!enonatrat1on.s of gocd 
character. 
2 .  '-obert Kennedy'• speaking cen be dete�1ned r••�n�-�!..1-� from h1a �war•n.•a of •ilitary . acOUOO'lic and �ersonal. coneequGtteR• of hio 
�pe1tch . Al.eo, there waa no evidence of K:tm��y rovealint; 
choTac.t-et'1nt1c,e of a deNaJlo�e ol.' ch..srlaten .. 
J ,  !\tJ sbCMn by public opt'tdon poll•, it !a reasonable to ass� 
th4t Robe-rt ltean�y ' e  apeaki'l\8 on the Viet.1'a1' 1•9Ue , enban.ced 
hi• peraonal and political popularity. 

. Ill K A N S A S  S T A T E  
Miss Jeanine I. Rishel 
Eastern Illinois University 
Charleston, Illinois 
Dear Miss Rishel: 
U N I V E R S I T Y  Manhattan, Kansas 66'102 
DltPARTMltNT OF POLITICAL ecrirNClt 
K£021E HALL 
April 24, 1969 
In belated response to your letter of March 21 I cannot give an 
exact percentage figure on the attendance for Senator Kennedy' s  Landon 
Lecture �r March 1 A .  1968 here which tn•U«llrated hi s presidential 
caap&1gn. HOWTer, I would guess of the 14,000 who attended, approx­
imately 10,000 were KSU students, another 1 , 000 wre faculty, and sta.f! 
and the re111&ining J,000 v.re citizens from Manhattan and throughout the 
state. Senator Juaes Pearson, Republican of Kansas, introduced Senator 
Kennedy. Governor Doeking was present. And so was Alf Landon, Mrs. 
Kennedy, and Mrs. Scott Carpenter. 
Senator lennedy appeared elated over the enthusiastic reaction o! 
the audience. It was the largest non-athletic in-door attendance in the 
history of Kansas, and he was swarmed over by students. However, I felt 
that the more exuberant of these , who grasped tor his cuff links and so 
forth, were high school students, particularly females. But as I said , 
Senator Kennedy .�s �lated, to the extent that when I saw him off at 
the airport on his plane he spontanteously embraced me. 
My own reaction was mixed. Of course, I was concerned about his 
secur¢ty, and I do riot say this a s  a matter of retrospect after his 
assa�nation, but rather because of his political style of joining the 
midst of the crowd.a, rather than remaining somewhat aloof. 
After his speech, I remarked to him that I myself had given about 
JO speechea throughout Kansas over the previous 2t years against the 
var in Viet Mala. And ,  therefnre , I particularly appreciated his Landon 
Lecture or a aia1lar vein. · hough we have had many famous speakers here 
for whom I haTe been responsible, I have never witnessed a more charis­
matic appeal or enthusiastic response to a speaker either here or else­
where. 
I hope these co11nents prove helpful for your thesis. 
With good wishes ,  
WWB:ods 
Sincerely yours ,  
WUliaa w. Boyer" 
Prof eaaor and Head 
f 7 
EDWARD M .  K E N N E DY 
Miss Jeanine I .  Rishel 
617 West State 
Trailor #1 9 
Charleston, 1 1 1  inois 
Dear Miss Rish e l :  
October l 0, l 968 
Mrs . J oscp1• D v ,, ,  . . .  P 1'  lios shored your leHer with 
Senator Edward M. Kennedy. 
Senatqr Kennedy suggests that you can locate copies 
of Senator Robert F .  Kennedy's speeches through requests to the 
U . S .  Senate for copies of the Congressional record for those 
speeches occurring in the Senate, and you con secure much of 
this material from books written by Senator Robert F .  Kennedy 
and in books written· about him by others, and l ists of such books 
would be available at a l most any public l i brary . 
The members of the Kenhedy fami ly  appreciate greatly 
the kind thoughts which prompted you tp write to Mrs . Kennedy 
and thank you for your generous expressions and your interest 
in others. 
With the Kennedy fam i l y 's every good wish, 
Sin�erely, 
NK:ss 
cc:  Senator Edward M. Kennedy 
•• 
HARVARD UNIVERSITY LIBR A R )  
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETfS 02138 
UNlvt:UITY Al.CHIVU 
M.iss Jean ine I. Rishel 
Eastern I l linois University 
Charleston , Ill inois 
Dear M i ss R i shel : 
A pr i 1 4 ,  1969 
Reference 
for reply. 
· �ur l etter of the twenty-first of Marcl to the Head 
ibtarian of Harvard University has beei referred to me 
� 1948 there were two speech courses a· Harvard , both 
given by A •sociate Professor of Public Speaking F• "'<ierick C. 
Packard. �ey were English E: Fundamentals of Sp �h , and 
English F: Public Speaking. I am sorry to sa� th t we cannot 
furnish th answers to your other questions . 
KCE:-
Sincerely you · � ,  
K imball C. Elkin 
Senior Ass istant in 1he 
- Harvard Universi y Archives 
K A N S A S  S T A T E  U N I V E R S I T Y  
D�A lllTM l'.NT 01' POLITICAL 8Cl l:NCI: , Kl'.DZIE HALL 
September 2 7 ,  1968 
Miss Jeanine I. Rishel 
617 West State Street 
Trailor :/I 19 
Charleston, Illinois 61920 
Dear Miss Rishe l :  
Manhattan, Kamas 66502 
In response to your letter of September 2 1 ,  directed to me ,  enclosed 
is the speech to which you refer. Please note that this was the 
speech with which Robert Kennedy launched his presidential campaign, 
as it was his first speech after - his announcement. About 14, 000 
people attended. A tape may be secured from KASC radio on our 







UftD ta..L,, M.A., •t • 1 • 
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-- -.-. -� .. -. ... ,,. COMMITT.- ON LA80R AHO PUaJc: ....,.ARK 
WA9HINGTOH, D.C. IOltO 
Miss Jeanine l .  l\ ..1.. 0:. • . e ·  
Eastern lllinois University 
Charleston, Illinois 
Dear Miss Rishe l :  
November 12, 1968 
Thank you for your kind lette r .  Senator 
Kennedy has asked me to reply . 
I ' m . afraid the only additional information 
we have available in our office on Robert Kennedy ' s  
February 8th speech in Chicago is that it was given 
before the Book and Author Luncheon. We do not have 
any ··tapes of Robert Kennedy 1 s speech in our office 
either .  I suggest you · conaact a local radio or 
television stations in Chicago. It may be that they 
taped it for their own use and would be willing to 
let you have it for a nominal fee • 
. I ' m  very sorry I cannot be of any further 
assistance to you on this . But I d o  hope that this 
1 nfn:n'.a t: j o.r. wi 1 1  i.. "' ""  � .. r,� 1 
Sincerely'· 
Press Secretary 
Edward M. Kennedy v 
I 71. K A N S A S  S T A T E  U N  I V E  R S  I T Y  �,,  lVms4s 66XJ2 DIVI-- CW aw .... . Ol'PICll OP DTDeelON UINO AND TllLD•ION, .. ICMOLe eftlWIUM 
October 8 ,  1968 
lllu 1 .. tae I. Blabel 




Dear Mlss Rlshel: 
Enclosed ls a tape of Senator Kennedy's speech made here at 
Kansas State March 18, 1968. 
Please return the tape to us when you are flnlsbed wt.th lt. 
Cordially, 
Autataat Manager 
PMOHll: eta U .... U 

"CONFLICT IN VlETNA."'t'' 
by Senator Robert F. Kennedy 
TI\e re.ason I ' m  here is that someone sent tlti a history of this city. 
And I found out th.tt it was founded. by people from Chicago who am.ue to 
Kaxv�aa to found a town nmaed Boston which they later eh•nged to Manhatta:a. 
So t knew I 'd be right st home . 
I a111 proud to come here at the invitation of Alfred M. Landon. l met 
him et the White HO\\se when be visited there . I know hew highly Preaident 
Kennedy reepected Governol" Lando?) , and the continuing contribution he ill&d&; 
am! sti.11 mak.t?s , to the public life of the country. 
l o alao gad to come to the home 1Jtat• of anoth•r K.aneu who 
vrote : "If our colle.se• and universities do not breed men who riot , who 
rebel »  who attf\Ck life with all the youthful vision and vigor. then there 
is �omethina wrona vith our aollegea . The mor• riots that come on collete 
cm?tpua•s , the better world for t.oaorrov." The man who wrote these words was 
that notorioWI man Willi.ma Allen White - the late editor of the EJaporia 
Gazette and one of the giants of American journaliem. He is an honored 11Wll1 
today; but when he lived an4 �ote, he was of ten l'aviled on your CA!llpua a'Qd 
S«:ro�• th• nat1ou a• •n extrem.iat - or worae .  for he apGk.e &s be believed . 
He did not conceal his conc•rn in comfortit\g vorda ; he did not delude hie 
t'eadera or hintttelf wi.th fal.8e herpes and illuaion.a � lt 1o in th1'1 spirit th.ot 
r �..rish to speak today. 
- ·-- - - --- -.-· --·--.. --·-._.....--.........---
___ 
... ·- -·----·· -�-. _ _ _ ..._ _ ___  .. ... _ __ _ 
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l'or thb t• a ,,..I' ef 4l'botee - a .,._ wtaMl v. c:hooe• not simply who 
11111 lead vs .  hut wt� ft vtah to � .. 1�: tM eouat� we want for ounalw!I 
and tbe lttnd we vnt for our cldldrn.. If tn tbi• year of choice we fubiiln 
new policiee eut of old tlluateu• , ,,. iaftn for ftnel.,.. aothlttl hut c:Ti•i.9 
foT the tni�n·• - and ve beqwath to our cbilclru the bltt•� haneec ftf thoe• 
Ct'fMA . 
1oT with all wa tuaYe d-• ,. ritb all our tas.u. ""_. and. richft ... 1 
('RU\' pnb 1-. ••• to g.- net 1••• 1 ht l·l'•·•••r. W. ar• 111 a tt.. of w.­
�TeceJenCK turt.ulene• . of tl•aser •1'4 queetto11lq . It 1• •t tt• root a qus­
U.oa o·f the net.a.al tt0\11 . The Pnatcl.-et eall.a tt uTNt.l•••n••• ; n wht l• 
c.af:\lnt1t Cllff1oere ad oacmntatora cell \i:A that AMrtea ta 4eep in a aal&i•ttt 
of t'hG •pirlt - dlecouraains lnitfat1 ... . paral1ctq will aftd action , dtY!d'!ng 
Amttncau fl'Om ene aaotll•• t.y their aa• , 11\air riew , •ftd th• eolor of theiT 
•kf."9 . 
Tb.*" ar• .. ..., cau..  hma an in the failed J'ro.11•• of �rtea 
itaelf 2  tn t� ohtldnn I i.. .. eeen . •tarvh• ia Mis•i••i•pi : idliag tbe1T 
li.-• tJN&'! io the P.tto ; �tttn.1 •uiclde in the deepai'l' et ltldlart re­
eet'V4ttoae � •� w•t.ehtq the.ll' p1'01MI fathe'le et t Yitbht werlt tu the Tnago4 
la11d• of !uten t•Gtw:lqr. Aaiotlter cau•• ie in our iuation in the fac• of 
daqer . W'e eeea �ally tl1'Abl• to eoatral tM -dolent diMNe1! within MT 
ct1t1M - oT the �11.atlon and 4utnaeticm of the c:ou.ntry , of the vater •nd 
land that ,,. uee ... nr ehtl.Cnn -t iahttit. And a third ,.nat cawae 
of 41.teonter.t la the ecMli'H W are felloviaa la V1etaat ia a Ml' wb1ab ho 
dirid-4 Amle?te_. u they haft -� bMQ divided stace you atete vaa called 
.. bloody IAM• .'' 
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All thu - q\&oatiODin.a and uncarta1nty at home , diYhi'N val' abroad 
ha• led U8 to a de•'P cruie of conf tdence : iu our leadersllip , t.n each 
othe� . and in our ftl'J' ••lf u • nation. 
Today I would apeak to you of the third of tho" srut crisu : of 
the war iJ:l Viet.aaa. I come here, to thia aerioua forum in the heaTt of the 
nation to diaCU9• with you why t nprd our policy there •• bankrupt : not 
on the b••h ef ewotlon, but fac t ;  not. I be.-. in cliehaa - bvt vith • 
clear aftd di•criainatias ._.. o! where th• utioaal i•t•r••t really 1·1u. 
t do oot vaot. u I believe aioet AMricau clo not wan t .  to sell out 
American int•re•t• . to aiaply ritbdrn , to rai.se the whit• flag o f  surrend­
er. That would be uaa.cc.epubl• to u •• a towatry alMl u a people. I t  
.. y h• that our vin• on tbia war vtll mt be in aan-nt . but what 1.e 
Urt><>rtant h that we dieeu•• our rie• , diacu.11a th• fact•, and tho aeek 
etT"en:th in the MMturlng 1-pulaea which have alvaya uaitad tbi• natioa. 
ln the faith that we u Anlericaoa to1•tber . ea fDMt•r aacl brtns to our 
••nice the •not1IOU8 force• that ra1• aero•• th• vorl4 in which we liYe. 
But I a� conc9n'Mad• •• 1 beli•ve 110et Amaricaa• are coaeernad . that the 
course tN are followin1 at the present u ... ta d .. ply vroac. I •• concern­
ed .  as t belie.ve raoat Alr.erieans are concerned. that we at'• acting aa if no 
other n.atioua exiettMl, aaainat th• jud.-Dt and deeiraa of neutrals and our 
b1atoric alli .. alike . 
t am �oftaenaed that, at the end of it all. there will only be more 
Aaoricana killed ; Hr• of our trusur• apilled out ; ad becauae of the 
bitterueaa aJMi hatred on every aide of thia var, aor• hundrede of thouaanda 
of V1etnma••• alau&htered • ao that they may aay u Tacttu aaid of Rome :  
_._._ ....._,._ ___ _ . _ _ , _________ _ 
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"They mada • deMrt, and called it peace . "  I do not thin that 1• what 
the Amerlc:an ap1Tit 1• really all about. 
Let ee besin this diecuaaion vith • uot• both P•T•onal and public. 
I \fas inVC)l..,S in uay of th• early deciaiou on Vietaaa, cleciaiona which 
helped set ua on our pr ... n� path. It .. y be that the effort vu d� 
fr«>n1 the atart • that it vu a.ver really po••ible to lartua all the J)«>l)l• 
of S<>utb Vietnaa under the rule of the •UCCN•ive IO"ffnaenu we supported 
-· aovermMmt• . ou after anotheT , riddled vltb cowwption, tnefticteney, and 
aree<l i govermMnte which did not ud cou14 not auccaeefully capture aad 
energise the Mt1oul f..itq of their people . If thtlt i• th• caM ,, u it 
well wiy be. then I • williq to bear ey ehare of the rupcmaibilit:y., .,__ 
for.e history and before 111 fellow-citiaena . But paat •rTor ia no eJtCU.9e 
for it• own parpatuatioa. Tragedy ia a tool for the livt.QI to &ain wiadoa, 
not a guide by vhich to liv.. Nov u aver, w. do ourealvea beat juatlc• 
wb.C?n w. neaaure our .. 1 .... qaiMt ancient teat• . •• in the Antigone of 
Sophocles : "All MD aau miataku . but a good ua yield• when be tnowa bi• 
cour•• ie vrong, and re-pair• the evil. 'nle ODly eta 1• pritlle . "  
Th• reveT••l• o f  the la•t aeveral IN>fttb• baYe led our •ilitary to 
ask fo:- 206 .000 1a0ra troops. Recently, it vu announced thet aooe. of them 
- a. ''moderate•' tact'eHe , it vu aaid - would soon be ••ut . But i•n' t this 
exactly whet ve haft alwaya doae tu th• paet! If we e.xnine the bi.story of 
tl\11 conflict , ,,. find the diaal sto'ty repeated t111te after ttM. Z.ery 
thafl s at ever.y ctri•i• � we haw denied that anything wa• wrona ; eent eore 
troops ; end issued aor• confidnt �orasW\tquea. hery time , we heve been 
u•trted that this OM laet step vould bring victory. And •-nry time, the 
.... -... -� ... ____ , 
_________ ._,... 
... ,. •.. ..,. .... 
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predictiorus and proataea have failed and been forgotten� and the demand hae 
been made again for ju•t one aore ate� up �h• ladder. 
But all the e•calationa , all the last •teps , have brought us oo closer 
to euccetU! than ve were 'before. At every occ:u1on. at every tit1111 . we have 
reeponded to the criaia in Vietnam with •ilitary action . We haTe lookad 
upon the conflict in South Vietrum •• juet a ailitary conflict .  It 1• �� 
.1uRt a military conflict - it ia a political and dtploMtic ttortflict and 
we have ignored thoa• t:wo areas - that ia vhy ve are in the trouble we are 
today . South Vietnaaeae aociety has become leea and l••• capable of or­
ganizing and defending itaelf t and va have mora and man aaaumed the whole 
burden cf the war . ln juet three yeara , we haw cone from 16,000 advi.eera 
to over 500.000 troopa ; f!'OTA no American bomblna Horth or South . to an air 
oara�aign agaiftet both, gr .. ter than that vaaed in all th• iuro,.an theater 
in Wo�ld War II : from i .. a than 300 American dead in all the year• prior 
to 1965, to aora than 500 4ead in a single week of e.o.bat in 1968 . 
And once again the Pruident tells us, aa wa have bMn told for 
twnty yeara, that "w• are going to wiu ; 0  "victoryB la com.in3 . 
'But vb.at at'• the tru. facts? What 1.e our present situation? 
J"irst , our coatrol over the nn:al population, ao long deecri})ed as 
the key to our effort• , hu evaporated . The Vice Preeident tell• ue that the 
i>•cificatioa program ha• '1stGpped •" lteporte frn the field indic.ate that the 
South Vietrumeee At'11y bu greatly incTeased ite tendency to upull into its 
CO'lllpounds in citiea and towne , eep.cially at nigb t ,  reduce its patrolling. 
and leave the �ilitia aDd re�lution.ary development cadres open to enemy 
incursion and attaek . "  Uadoubtedly, thie is one weaaoo why . over two rece.nt 
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weeks. our combat deaths - 1049 - were eo .uc:h greater than those of the 
South Vietn&UMt•• - 551. t think that ie an iadtcation of the direction 
we ' re ftM:>Vin1. This ha1 b6C01118 an Aaericaa war • • • it 1• ao longeT t-b• 
war t'f the South Vietnaese. At the debate in the ue•bly of the South 
Vietnen.ee parliament, a man got up when they dtaeua•ed whether they ehovld 
dratt et,ht••n-year-olda or !liueteeu..,.ear-olda. Be eaid wby should yO"UDSJ 
11ee of ei1ht .. n-year-old and aineteen.-year-old. why ehould ve draft them, 
for t�e �ovtb Vt•tn.&1ae•• Al'll)y! Why should they be aent to fi&ht America'• 
var for tbet1! I don ' t  think thAt 'a aatiafaetoyY , aG4 t think it should be 
changed . t.ike it or not, �be go•el"llMnt of South Vi•tnam 1• pursutna an 
en�l&'ft ,,olicy. lte writ nms where American &1'119 ptttect i t :  that far and 
no far�het' .  To extend the power of the SaiaOft g.,..e-rnaent over ita owa country . 
we now can 11•• , will be in ueenc.e equiYalent to the reconquest a.nd occupation 
of waoat ot th• entire 09t1cm. 
Let ua clearly undet'at.ud the full 1uplications of that fact.. The 
point of GUr paClification �t"attona VU elvay• ascribed U 0vi.Jm1ng tbe 
beftrts and miftd1" ot tba �pl.e. We recognised that eiving the country­
atde military security against the Viet Coug wovld be futile - indeed that 
it would be t.poeaibl• - unl .. • th• people of the coufttryside th.selves 
carte to identify their iutere•ts with oure . aad to assist not the Viet Cong , 
but the 5atcon gove�t . For thi• we recogni&ed that their ll!indc would 
bave to be ehansed - that their natuTal inc11aatina would be to support 
the Vi•t Co1l1t , or at 1>.et reaain pus1ve. l'ather than aacrifice for foreign 
white 11en. or the tncte Saigon 1cwennent . 
lt 1• thia effort that ha• beea moat aTavely ••t back in the laat 
___ _ ___ ... _ __ _ , ___ _ _______ .... ·-�-
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-.mth. �• c:anaot chance t.be Ill� of p•Ol)le io v1ll.a1•• contnlled by the 
91Mtmy . !be fact te, •• all na.ognise , that we cai:mot l'oa•Hrt control over 
those vtllaa• now in tme1JY baud• wtthnut repe.9t1ng tbe whole proees• ot 
bloody 4utructioa which bu l'•'Ncecl the eouatr,.eid• of South Vietnam 
thl'cuaho�t the lut three yeara. Sol' could ve tbua keep t:ont-rol without 
cbe prueooe of aillt.ou of AMeriean troopa. l f ,  ta Che yean t�• vi.lla ... 
aod hultlta wse coutnlled by Saison. the aoveT1J1ienc ba4 bl'ou:ht htmuty . 
eocta.l :retona, 1nd - if that had bappeed, 1f th4l ..., proai11u of a 1'W 
aa4 h•tC•T lite to� the people had been fulfilled - then , ta the p�e•• 
of T•eooquaat, ve aitht apJtear u lib•s-atore : jut ae we 41.d in � .  
de•p1ta tbe �•tattoo of va-r, 1n 1944-4S. But th• itr0idse9 of r•fona 
wre not bpt. ConupUon aa4 alM&ee of �min:l•t�atift JMMtT hne conti.nlMd 
to tM.• d•Y• Laad r.ton has novai: bHtl •n than an -.pty pl'.U• .  Vtw­
iug the par.fonmnae of etMt Sdaaa fP'lemAMmt owet th• lut three yeartJ , there 
la no naaoll f O'C the Souch V1eta81118ae peaaant to f iaht for the axteutaa 
of it• •thevllty or to new the fu�·�het" dewatatton th•t effort vill bxt111 
ua aaythina but a cal•tty. Ae " COft••q,wmc• . �h• political war - •o loQ& 
4eecrtbe.d u �· oaly "" that counu - ha• aona vitb th• pactfiution 
pnar• th&� wu to win it. lo a �eal •eue, tt ..,.. oav � lat beyond 
neall . 
nae .. coiK avtdnt fact: of the l•t tvo aon&bll t• th•t the Sataon 
Oev•t'nlnent 1• M llO!'ll o� kthl' an ally tbe.u tt Ya• ),efon. ; that lt aa.y 
nel\ be 1-; ad that the var laGorabl1 u perill& ..,n. not i .... u 
AMrican efmt. Aaeriua o.ff1elala coaticu• co talk abo.tt • inar:aaant 
..,1,, aaarata• .., ,  mn.na with ·••r .. c. eo.petene•." ta1dn& hold "bmarkal>ly 
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wel.l , �1 doint. '*a wey 11 voN good piece 4f vot'lc. of ·recoftry."" I we• in the 
h�cut'f.w Hr&nch of the goiven.ment ftol.'I\ 1961 to 1964. In All thoee year•. 
v• heard the 1ame 110¥101 prowd.•e• •bout thft South VletllAQeae government � 
coi-l"\19t1on would sooa be altmtnnted , 1An4 refol'l::I voW.d coae., progrmu wei"O 
bo1\$� it1fused vitb new enettaY• But tho&• were not the facte then, and they 
at'• llOt the facts today. the fact• a.re tbat there ta et111 no tot.al 11M)b11-
1tiat!M\? no price o't' wage control•, no rationing . no cwettti.• wo.rlf,. th• 
f &ctA .i·e • u • COl.lD.!Sittee of tu Rouae of lteprueistatives haa told ue, that 
land re tom i• !llOV1ng baekwaTd , with the zovel'UM'ftt fOt'CM belpin� landlord• 
to eolle�t exorbitant buk rents f'r01'l the P••uumt"'l'y. 'nl• f•cts ue that 
eigl1te«n-y•1tt"-old SO\lth VietnmMH at"• still not being drafted ;  liliougb llOW ,  
•• Yny t'blao in the peat . we ai-e aaau-red that thla will happen •oon. The 
tacts are th.lt thou.ands of youag South Vtettwmffe. buy th.ei� deferunta from 
tdli tat"y ••nice vhilo Am.•Tiean M&t'ine1 di• at Ille Saab . I don• t accept 
t.b�t . 
The f•cts aTe that tbe government bu arreated monb anti labor led.­
us , fomer Pt>ff14e.ntiat cat\didat•e and govenmant ot'ficta1e . including 
�rc.mimlnt members of t?Nt Coaattteo for the l't'••ervat:ton of the Nat1oa. 1.n 
which A!ae1'icen otfiel11l •  l'lKed •uch high hep&• juet a few veeu age. 
Me�nwhtle . the ;oven.ant ' •  enoTmOua conupttou contirua•• , de'btl­
ltattne, South Vi•�Nl!l and crtppl1QI 0\11:' effort to help its peotle. COUl­
mitt••• of th�' S.ute aad loue• of hp'l'Hentati.e• have officially 
doCtmnttd the exi•t•nee , eteut., and reault• of this coriuption: Amerl.ean 
AID ftlOney •tolea, food d1nrt41<1 frOl!l refugee• .. goft�t poata boupt and 
aold While ••••nttal taeb raain undone. A •ubcosatttee of the Senate 
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Co�ittee on Govern.aent OJ>er•tiooe b4s reported that the Vietnameao Collecto� 
of Cu1no1H ha• •naaaed: in eanapling 30ld and opium, and that he �1uJ protected 
by fiaure$ e°'"'a hitth•� in the &OYGrnmeot, Pre•ideat Johnaon haa roaponded to 
criU.cin of aorrupttcm in Vietnm by Tnindin3 ua that there i• atealtn1 in 
!etnmon t .  Tex•• . I fo� oae do aot: bel1Gve th&t lleaa!lout f.a so conupt. I 
do not believe that any l>Ublie official, 1n any Aaeric.an city� ia ensaaed in 
�gling gold and dope i se111US draft defel"Ulent• , er poc�t11\8 milliona of 
4i)llar• in u .. s .  aovenment funds , llut , llOWever corr\ll)t any city il'l the 
Unit4d Statas 1NY be, that cerwption ts not eo•t.iug the 11v•• of Americtan 
aoldien; while the pervuive corl'Ul)tion af the Govenuaent of Vietn• . u 
•n kMiTican official haa tol4 UIJ ,  1• a a1gnificant ca"WJe of the proloag•ti�n 
of the war and the continued A!Mrie.an casualties . A• this gove�Jent con­
t!.n�es on ita p�aeent cour•e , and our suppol't fol' it eontinua , the eff•ct 
can enl.y be tet le4ve u totally taolated froa tn. peopl.• of Vi•tft&1 . Our 
fighti�g �� d .. erve better thAu that. 
Th1wc1, it 1:1 becce1ng .ore evtdant with every puatq day that t.lle 
vict.orie-a we �cbf.eve will only co• at the coat of dutructioa fer the u.tion 
w once ho,.e4 to h.lp . Evon before th1• winter . Vtetaas and its peoplA wel"e 
clis!nt•at:atif.Ut ucdn ti. blove of wr. Nov hardly a city in Viatnam hat 
be.en epaed f� th• new r•va,s, .. ot th• past two aontb.e. Sateon of.fie.Lale 
aa.ay that llUl'1J three qua.rte-rs of a million new refuaeea h•ve ken creat-'• 
to Mid to the exi•tina r•fusla• �-pulation of two �1111.oa or aiore . No one 
ntally know• the aumhe'r of ci'ri.lian casualti•• · Tha city of Ru., �itb ao•t 
ot th• country' •  cultuC'Al and arti•t1c h•-ritaa• . 11 .. la rvS.ae : Of it• ?GJ>­
\al�ttoa of 14.S,QOO,. fully lll.000 AT-e n:l.d i. "'• hollel�••·� �r• is n-0t 
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cno�lt food . not enough •helter. not encu.tgh �ical care . There ia on_ly 
death tmd t'li8ety and dest.l:'tlction. 
Jin �erican �ancter a.a-id of the town of Ben Tra , t�t t became necea­
�aey to de.troy the tovn in ol"da.r to saw i t .  '1 That kind ot •alvation. 1• 
net . in �y judfilMlt'lt ,  a:a act ve here in the tr .  S .  <tan l)reauf!ie to perfont 
for thf!f.l. But , we •et ui:.: our go•ernment ,  ve fll\Htt aek ouraelveA ; fetr w. 
ar� r•sponaible , not ju•t those in �aeb1nston . nett juet t�so io the •�­
ocutive bratnch of tho f;O-'ft'tnNnt but all of ue in thf.e country . t 'n r-ea­
f.ltm•ibl� and you are reaponaible, because tllis action 1• tak1nt place 1n 
V1etnMr in our ..-am - in the name of tho U .  S .  of NM.rica - and ve have the 
rigllt to uk queattona •M ve muat aak que•t:iou of out own goverament and 
ot ourselvu. 
Whel'e doae auch logic end? !f it 'becomes "'nece•eaey•s to derJtroy all 
of Sout.h Via.tnaa f.l\ ordel' co ueavc�· i t .  will we do that �? And if V'9 cetre 
ae> little about South Vi•� that ve ai:a willina to eee the land destroyed 
and it• people dead . tlwln why ara we there in tbe !iret pl�ce? 
Can we ot"d&in to ourselves the awful ujeaty of Ood - tr> decide Vhat 
cities and villas•• are to bo dast:toyed .. who will live and uho will d.le. aad 
who will jetu the refugou wander1n£ in a deae.rt of GUI' own c-reat1on'I lf it 
1e true that we lwav1t. a co:a.�itmeut to tbe South Vietnameee p6ople , we must 
es'k , are they being c:onaulted - in Rue » o-r Ben 'h'e. or in tbe villages frora 
vhicb the: three ailllon �erugeu have fled? If tbey believe all tM d.•ac.b 
and deattuet.ion an a lesser l\Vt1 tha11 t.be Vtot Cong, why did they not warn 
ue when the Vue Cona eama into ttue, and the don.as of other oid.e•, before 
�be Tat Offenat.._? Wby did tbey aot join the fight! 
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H: :ti; alao $&1.d. tMt ve aN p�otect1U£ 'l'bld.l..and - or ,erhape llswaii 
··  fr.m\ the le&iO'tW of t1'wt CoB'lllUnUt•. An W4t Tully protecting the r&$t 
of !.�outooa�t: A,su by tbi.8 sprudi� e.oaf11ct1 And in ny �ie. 111 the 
de�u:wet.10\l of !loutb Viet.- � it8 people a penateaiblo aaau� of defonHt 
l.Qt d bav• no a.ieuude11au.oc!iq. Th� Viet Coq ara a brutal •Utea7 
iud�.,.A� 'time e,-.1 ti-. again. they have abowa their w1111ngneaa to sac'.l'iff.ce 
innocent ctrlli3ns . to •nsa1• in torture end 1au'l'tl•r a-ad despicable ten-cl.• 
to achieve their- ends. Th•R oan \\e no eaay JAOral •ft8Wr t"O �Ma wu , no 
ei:w-e:tded cond.in.umaU.on of Aarloan atiou.. I den ' t beU .. cve the. ""°'i. of 
��ti.th Vifat� w.ant doaiutiDn and eofttnl by the Viot Coq , the National 
LU.��rt•ti�n Prout Ot' the C�ist• o� Nol'th Viet:mtm; but neitht1' do 1 
�u . .,va tMt th•y w-nt tQ. he domiute.4 by the u .  s .  of America OT any fore:tan 
Uh.at w -•t uk Ot.J'l'S•lVt• ts vbetbel' we have a 1'11J-ht t<> bring •<> 
m.<:lh dyu·u.e.tion to ••tll4lr le.ad. without cl.at' anti GOflviMtna evidence 
tlut.t thi� is what tu people want. But that i• irrecuely th.a &v1deOG$ wa: 
d.o not haw . W't-.al thtWJ' want ts peaee. not do.tll.i .ut1ou by any outsttle f-orc:e.. 
liifid th11t ia ·vt.iat. � .ar. l'hlly cowsitc.d to halp bring theta. aot in 80'M 
iM�'t'ittit• fattlft • but Yhtle 8c:lflN nrapt1 of life i-aeain atill to be &&Ved 
e��m thfl boloeau.t .  
The fourth !act that 1• now WIOftl clear than ev.r ia that the ws.r in 
Vi'11tn&."ll , fai- ff'<* b•int che laet cT1tic&l tHt far the Uaited States is in 
fe<?t wsak•tna out' picHJ1tion in Aaia •ild aretmd th• wor14. and et'Cdio.g thti. 
ettucwra of iaCe't"Mt1oaa1 c::oo,.rat1on �tcb baa dire.etly eup\)oTted O"Uit' 
••ur1ty f�r tho put thr .. deced... Io put:•lY ailitary t•rM . the v.tr han 
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alrea<iy st-c1pped u a  of th• graduated-�respoa&e capability that vei have labored 
ito bat'd to build for the last seven yeoro. S"roly th� '1ot"th Kor.e3ns we1'e 
fm.b�ldened to seize the Pueblo because they knew that the Uuited States 
silnply QUnnot af fo�d to fight auother Aaian war while we are 80 tied down 
tn Vtetna?t. ii:• set out to prove our tdlU.ngnua to keep eur commitmeut• 
everywhe�e in the world . Wlutt we are ensuring inatead ia that it ia most 
unlikely that the Aaerican people vould ever again be willing to again engage 
in this kind ot s truggle. Meanwhile our oldeat and &tl'Ongaet allies pull 
bsel� to their ovn shore• - leavins u• alone to polic• all of hia ; while Mao 
'l"H·-Tung and hi• ChineM comrade• eit patier�tly by. fishting ua to the last 
Vietuameee : votching us weak•u a nation which •itht have provided A stout: 
barrier asainat Chin••• expanaion eoutbward ; hoping that we "llTill further 
tie ouraelves down in protTacted war in Cambodia , Lao• . Thailand � confident ,  
as it is reported froa !!ong toug , that the war iu Vietnam !\will increasint\',lY 
bog down the United Stat•• , aapping 1ta reaourcea , diacreditina its power 
�r•ten8iona . alienatia., it• allies , fyayi�g it• tie• vi.th the Soviet Union . 
and asgrav.atina: diesension. acaong Americans at horite . 11 Aa one Amlilric:an ob-
server puts i t .  troly �'\:le seem to be playing th• script the way Mao writes 
All thia bears directly and heavily on the question of whethi)r more 
i ... ,. .. . 
tToope �houlcl now be aent to Vietnaa - and. if moT• are aent. wh&t their 
mission will be. \le are entitled to ask - WI are required to ask - how Aaoy 
ta0re men, how many more liv•B 1 hov n\UCh more detatruction v111 be aabd,, to 
'Provide the ailitary victory that i• always just al."OUl'ld the comer t to pour 
1ntn thts bottomle•• pit of our drumet 
Rut tllia qucetion the Ad.aini•t�ation doe• not aad cannot answer .  It 
., ....... ·-•- •··--------·. .. V ··-·- · _...... _ _________ r __ "lot _ _____ • ___ ... _---�-- ....... _ .. - • -· -
bile no aMWe., .. nene but the ever-•1t]>aad'lna uae of 111 U;a17 force and the 
ltvas of our t>�&V• •oldien, :t..n a confli4t wbu'• ail1taiy force � failed 
eo 9'<11Ve IUIYthtfts ta t!M ,, .. , .  The �r••ident bu offered t.o neaoti•te .... 
,et thia v.•kaed be �old us a.,ain that he ae«ke not c�romise but victory, 
'1 at th� •aotiatias table tf �•ibl• . en th• bat�•f1-ld tf •ceaear, . 11 
ht at o Mal negotiatiq table. theft! can b9 no 0vtccoq•' foT either aide; 
OILly a painful and d1ffic"1t coaproad... To Me1t. ricte>ry at the c:cmfenace 
table i• to � that. 7eu will 8"8'1' wuoh it. lnatead the var will go 
oo, yur alter t•J'ri�le yur ·· until tboee vbo eit in the •••t• ot hi.ah 
policy a-re 1MD vho eeek aw:>ther path . And that -.e be clone thi• y-ur. 
And it its for that naaon that 1 ofter ayself u & calMliote fol' Pr .. Ldent 
of t� Uotted gtat ... 
io• it h 10QI ., .. t t1M to ask : what 1• tbia war doing to ueT ot· 
eot.t1'ff 1t is cc•tJ.ng u JIOll&Y� fully o�tourt'b of our fe4ual budge.t , �' 
that i• th• ... 11.Ht pwice we P•1· The coat ts iu our youag MD ,  the t.eu 
of thou9aoda .ctf t:bdr li•• cut off fo�l'. The co•t 1• in our wot'ld 
pos1ti1:Wl, in neutral• and alU.• alike., every day •re baffl-4 by amt e• .... 
tn.nged fToa a policy they camtiOt undeiiataftd . 
Hither yet 1• the prtee we P*J' in our own 1n•iwo1t lives . and in 
th s-pf.rit of OUT coaatry. lfoi- t-h• flret tille SD • cen.wr,, we have open 
re�detanc• to aer:viee i• the uwae of the nation. Jor the fiH� ti• per­
haps tn our b1.etor,, we h4l'ft ll•utlone from our a1a1 oa political aad 
•ral iro"1lds. The fl'oat ••.a• of o-u.r nawapap•r• ehow pbot.oaraph• of 
Mler:tcan soldiaTI tortul'ing 1>t'ieonera. h•ry nisht • vetch honor on thtt 
•••nint aeu .  Violene• .-,had• loa.oTab1y nro•• the nat1o�. filU.na our 
-�-.. .,..,. �------- ---�----------�- -- -----�----�-.--�---....�-� �-----
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atr•ete and cr.inliq our U.v.. . A1'd whatew.r the coete �o ..._ , l•t ua think 
•f th• yowia -ft we have seot there s aot juat th• kilhd , wt t.bon who 
ha•• to kill ' aot jut th• ..Ued, but alao tbon vbo aut look upon the 
reaulte of what c� do. 
It .. ,. n ••ked . ts not •ueb dea�a4•tioa th• coat of all wal'ef Of 
oour•• it ie. Th•� i• why waw i• aot aa eaterpri.ae ltghtly to be W>d•rtaken 
a.or prolonaed oae _,..nt �t ite abaol\at• MUl•ity. All thla , the dea­
truetion of V1•tlWl»1., the eoat to CNWMlvea , tb• 4.ans•r to th• world. -11 
t'hifJ ,,,� would euQd villia1ly,. if it ••••ad co Mn• ao.. Wl'tlrtlbtle end .  
But tl\Al coet• of the war t• pr•••nt coul'•• far outveiah aay�bt.ea ve can 
nasou.bly hope co r.,,aio by lt. t.r ounel'ffe or for the people of Vi•t.tillfil . 
It u:mst be oudad, aecl it can be ended, ta a peace of br ... MU vhtt ha� 
fought Neb otMT vitb a terdl>le fury. uch beltenna he and ha alone wae 
h the r:taht. We � pt"aye4 to 41.ffereet pde, aad the prayers ot oei.ther 
ha-ve Mt'-l1\ an.vera4 fully. Jiov. while �here 1.e till tia• foT aca. of the& 
to 1N pu tly acaiwerad , now is th• t111o to atop. 
AQd the fut :le that \»UC.b c.11 be doae . We en •  .. l hove U.l"l.t for 
tvo yea-rs . but u ve ha•• -� <lone .. D980tiat• ritl:a the Natioul Libar­
atioa 'h'ont. We eau, u va ha .... •v.r clone, UMSI'• the rrout a pauiae 
place in the pcU.cical life o.f South VS.cnaa. We can. u we •• refulof 
to do tod.,, be.ala to 4 .. •oalat.e the va� , �enc. on pftt.cttq pop­
\Jl&tri aroa•� Mid ttn&e eave AlleYic&D li'M8 and •law down cbe deatl'UCt1ou 
of �be cc:nm�1Y•i4•. We oea, a• vo � DeV•r 4ou, tnsuc that the Oowm­
'Mnt of flouch Vi•t- l>roadft th baae , iaetl�1.1•• na1 nfona . acd Hek 
• honor.a\>lCl .. ttlwaant vi.th their fellow countryme1l. 
·--�---·_........_. __ _ --- ----------------�--.,._.�,. ...... .....,..�'!I 
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'this 1• no- radical program of autn"ander. Thia 1• no •ell-out of 
�rican interHta. Thi• 1• • mod.eat and reaacmalbe progra. d•11is.ned w 
adv.anae the iat•n•t• of this aouatry &Cd. save 80111eth1.n1 from the wreckage 
for the l'•Pl• of Vt.at-. 
Thie prop• wouJ.4 t1a f�n: more effective tha.'C the l)l'C:.sent eoui"se o.f 
this Ad=iniatrat.ion - whose only reapona� to failure i• to repeat it ou a 
larg•T scale� Th1• program . ""1th U:s U!Ol'e 11mit.ed cost.a, would indeed bu 
f41:' $90l'e lik•lY to ac�lish ouz tr'UGI obje.cti'lr'es. 
And th•·refore even Ch.ts t\'.mdeet and t'U•enable pt'Ogru ts 1�'?0a•1.bl$ 
while out present l•ad•t'flhip , uadeT the illusion th•t ailtt.ary Yictol'Y ta 
jt.11't Ahe.t.d� pluu3o.a deeper inte the ttwamp that i• our preaent c:ourse . 
So r � Nll'• today:; to this (il9ht Univ.nit)'. to uk YO\IT help � 
n�t for me ,  but for yc>t.l'I' e:ountry and for t-he peol)le of Vietnam . 'You are 
the p.ople. as Prutdent Kennady •aid , who have "th• luat t1ee to the 
pJ:·•eGnt aM the i1'e&t4t8t et•ke to tM future . ti 1 t.ntp you to lea'lm the 
harsh fa.ct.ts th4t lurk beMnd the u.sk of official il.luai.on vith which we 
have con.ee&.led ou.r trc.ao ¢ittumat.\meea , even from ours•lvee. our country 
ta 1n dangor : not just f't'ORt fo�f.31' enerid•• ; but above all� from eur own 
ciatuided policies - 4ll\d what thlty c.an do to t:he nation tho.t Thoinas 
J•f ferson once told WI w&s tba 1 .. t .  beet t hope of !Mn. Th•l'• is a contest 
on, not for the n1le of �rtu. l)tlt foir the heart of M.e\"ica. ll'\ theme 
\\eXt e1abt month• � we &re �oil'l1t to dee1de wbat thta country will etaad for, 
anc� what kind of un w,e are . Sa I ••k for your help . in the cities and 
lle>1P83 of this st•t•, into the t..mrn9 and fame l ecmt-ribut.ing YoUt' ecmcem 
and action� vnrning of the 44cge'f' of vhat ve aTe dointJ • � t'he prMiise of 
8 1 .  
wh a t  'IJ4! can do. I ask you, as tena of thousand» of young man and wCJS1en are 
tioin}S !2ll ovt1r th.1• land , to ot"g&ni·m:e yourseh"fta , e.nd then to g.o forth :a:ad 
wor1' for new policiu - work to char.g• our d1recticn - and thus restore our 
plac� at th� point of 110r&l leadership ,  in ouT country, in our own. b�erts , 
aod �11 around the world . 
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A'SSTRACT 
A aHETOllC� NW.YSIS OF ROIERT F. k"'BNNIDY :!_ 
SPIAUHG 9! ':Ki . ISSUE O�CS:_!JL VI�. 
AS 'RlW!ALlID IN HIS KANSAS ADORES�.' 
''CO�ICI .IN YJ.KTNAM'' • 
Maay Aaerleau haft Nrshaled their rhetoric to suppoi-t or to 
tteuoune� the V1et11• var . Ou of the aoet inai8tent votieaa heard . waa 
that of Senator Rob•rt 1. ltarmedy . 
It ,,... the hypothesis of thia study that Robert F'rancis 
\C.ennedy ' • •pe4lking , en the issue of �•ace in V1etnAIM vae intelligent and 
r.1tponsible. 
§tat ... nt of Pu.,!!!!!. '11\e puqto•• of the •�tac!y va• tG t .. t the hypothesis 
by an.alyaiq aod evaluaUna "Conflict la Vietnu . "  a speeeh deltwretl by 
Robert Kennedy in Manhattan, Kaua• on MArch 18, 1968. Thi• particulat' 
apaeeh waa •elected for th• followin; reaaoa. : (1) The speech stated a cl .. r 
�oaition on tannedy'• •tand in VietOllD : (2) Textual authtmtictty v .. eatab­
llshed by • tape reeordin1 ; (l) The audiance could be identified ; aud (4) 
Tbe s�rteh ,,.. cndited with launchin1 Jennedy ' e  preaidentJ.al campaign . 
Material•. Th-e p�imery eeuree.a ueed to 1ain inforaati.on about Keimecty , the 
i••u•• with vht�h he dealt ,  and the society to which he epou . were: ��!'.! 
-------·--- -------- ·- ------- -
F. l'.ennedy: .!P;!at!_e of CbaAI!. (1:.V York ; Pocket Boob ,  1968) ; &__!'. I.. : 
!!!__hit• &ad Dea_t_t, (Nev York : {)(>,11 Publishing Co . •  1968) ; Kallin ;&nd 
"rh• tJ .  s .  l.n Vi•tua (New York 2 Dial PT••a ' 1967) i __ __  ... _  .__,_ 
'Buttinier. ' e .  !h!....!t11all.ar Draa011 (HMr torkt Jredertck A. PrugC!r .  1958) ;. 
. and �guyen Van-Thai and NIVJn V•n-Mnna ' •,. !_Jih.o't HJ.!tog of .!��1l!l,!. 
(Vietn&m : Tiinee 'Publiabtn1 Co . ,  1958) . 
Criteria and 'Pt'ocedur•. 
_ _ __ ____ _...,... _..._ .... 
Thfl particular criteria u.ect in this 11tudy were 
derived from tboae used by Tau JCappa Alpha 1n sel�tina their t'ec:ipiant for 
Speaker··�f-tl•e-year avard. 1 Tvo aaj&� question.a vexe cooatructed , in o�der 
Kennedy' •  intellincnr.• �as analyzed by anaverin1 th• followi•e 
1 .  What 'Were tha aeeumptiooa upen which the •PMCh vaa bAMd'I 
2 .  What va• the •P••k•r'• purpose and what were the main 1deu 
set tcrth in the ap.echt 
3 .  Wero thts ideas varrantad hy the evidence uaed t.n the •pee.ch! 
4 .  tfere the tdua well adapt•d to the &udi.ance? 
!n �eter.a.tn1a3 whether Robo�t Konnedy'• speakina was reaponaibla, two 
1 .  Did the speaker re•ul au awareneas of the &O<lial coue.equeftcer. 
of hi• •J>fff!hf 
2 .  Wiis the speech free from d�aoguery and charlataoiMJ. a.a shown 
by content . lan1ua1e . and delivery? 
Thera are several conclusions which can be drawn afte� the 
---.......... _ ___ ..._ ___ ._............._ ----- --- .. --· ---··· -... --
laTau Kappa Alpha Speaker of the Yoar Crit•rla , "  Th4a SE_uker 
(Crawforda·.r1lle, Indiana , 1955) . 
aM.lytJis of t.be speech of RobeTt Kannedy , given at J.arusas State University , 
MAtrch l t\ ,  1968. 
1 .  From Robert Kennedy'• assUJApti<>n that the UU1te<f Statee jH>licy 
in Vietu.� vau wrol\g and from hie following aevan main ideas , 
one could determine his speaking int!!!.!Jent . Kennedy 'a seven 
'f34in ideas wore : 
a .  bB�lations have brought tha U .  S .  no closer t� e1ucce&t1 than 
w• v•re bafore. 
b .  AAerican control over the rural population iu Vietnam h&8 
evaporated . 
c .  Recently, the S&igo� �o"ntnnnent 1� no betteT an ally th�n it 
•as before. 
d .  Vi<!.torie• thot Americta achieve s ,  will only come at the cost of 
destruction foT the nation we once hoped to help . 
• ·  The var in Vietnaa is we�kentni the U .  S .  Po•ition in A.zia and 
around the world. 
f .  The hish••t price the U .  s .  is paying , ia cost in our inne�­
l!W>at live• azad the •pirit of our country. 
5 .  Th• U .  S .  must aagotiate with the National Liberation F�on t ,  
begin to deescalate tlw! war. and 1nsiet �hat the governroent of 
South VietnMl! broaden itR base , b•foro an e'ftd will cO'me to the 
wttr. . 
Thea• idea• all basically implied that unl••• • chan,• did take 
place io U .  S ,  involvement . there would he no end to tho war in 
Vietnaa. The ideas vere appende4 to general Aaericau beliefs 
about war , peace, survival of eelf and of co1mtry. 
Aleo, Robert Kennedy's apeakina can b� determined intell�..i!n� 
by ht.a ex-prese1ons of siood-will t'nd dcaoMtratiQns of good 
character • 
2 .  l!Obert Kennedy ' •  epeakiag can be determined !�•2o�aible from hio 
awarenas• of military, •cotlO!Ric and per•onal coneequences of his 
•P••ch . Alao , there vae no evidence of Keuaedy revealill8 
char�t•rietica of a demaaogue or charlatan . 
3 .  � ahavn by public opiniou polls , it is reasonable to aaau.e 
that Robert Kennedy'• speaking on the Vietn.aa iaaue , enhanced 
hi• pcraoaal an� political popularity. 
